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The	  purpose	  of	  the	  present	  work	  is	  twofold	  –	  first,	  to	  argue	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  metaethical	  claims,	  where	  
they	  seem	  to	  concern	  the	  epistemic	  statuts	  of	  moral	  judgment,	  or	  the	  latter’s	  relation	  to	  the	  world,	  are	  
best	  read	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  error	  theory.	  Second,	  it	  argues	  that	  attempts	  to	  dismiss	  realist	  readings	  of	  
his	  claims	  about	  other	  sorts	  of	  evaluative	  judgment	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  less	  successful	  than	  thus	  far	  
supposed.	  	  
It	  is,	  correspondingly,	  divided	  into	  two	  parts.	  The	  first	  marshals	  textual	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  error	  
theoretic	  reading	  before	  proceeding	  to	  examine	  and	  find	  lacking	  a	  rival	  reading	  –	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick’s	  
non-­‐cognitivist	  interpretation.	  Lastly,	  it	  considers	  and	  dismisses	  an	  objection	  to	  the	  error	  theoretic	  
reading	  advanced	  by	  Brian	  Leiter.	  	  
The	  second	  part	  focuses	  on	  realist	  readings	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  metaethical	  claims,	  and	  on	  Leiter’s	  arguments	  
against	  them.	  Its	  aim	  is	  to	  show	  that	  these	  arguments	  fail	  to	  establish	  Leiter’s	  conclusion	  that	  Nietzsche	  
is	  best	  read	  as	  an	  antirealist	  about	  evaluative	  discourse.	  Two	  realist	  accounts	  are	  examined	  and	  
defended	  (Schacht’s	  objective	  realist	  reading	  and	  Foot’s	  weak	  realist	  reading)	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  the	  realist	  approach	  to	  making	  sense	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  metaethically	  themed	  remarks	  is	  a	  















In	  Support	  of	  the	  Error	  Theoretic	  Reading	  
	  The	   present	   chapter	   undertakes	   to	   establish	   that	   Nietzsche	   maintained	   an	   error	   theoretic	   stance	  
toward	   moral	   judgment	   throughout	   his	   philosophical	   life.	   Whether	   or	   not	   he	   retained	   this	   stance	  
regarding	   nonmoral	   value	   judgments	   is	   a	   more	   challenging	   question	   and	   will	   be	   the	   focus	   of	   a	  
subsequent	  chapter.	  Before	  arguing	   for	   the	  error	   theoretic	   reading,	   I	  will	   suggest	  why	  any	  attempt	   to	  
offer	  an	  account	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  metaethics	  is	  called	  for.	  Most	  philosophically	  astute	  readers	  of	  Nietzsche	  
will	  note	  a	  certain	  tension	  in	  his	  writings	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  vehemence	  and	  authority	  with	  
which	  he	  states	  his	  own	  evaluative	  claims,	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  his	  apparent	  antirealism	  with	  regards	  to	  
value.	  Nietzsche	  appears	  quite	  ready	  to	  assert	  the	  superiority	  of	  his	  own	  evaluative	  position	  or	  theory	  of	  
value	  over	  those	  of	  others.	  In	  the	  opening	  sections	  of	  The	  Antichrist,	  for	  instance,	  Nietzsche	  tells	  us	  that	  
our	  modern	  ethos	  in	  wrong	  in	  considering	  the	  contemporary	  European	  –	  in	  truth	  a	  ‘domestic	  animal’,	  a	  
‘herd	  animal’,	  a	   ‘sick	  human	  animal’,	  a	   ‘Christian’	  –	   to	  be	  of	  great	  moral	  worth.	  The	  type	  of	   individual	  
that	  is	  truly	  of	  value	  and	  worthy	  of	  being	  ‘bred’	  is	  what	  he	  terms	  a	  ‘higher	  type’	  or	  ‘a	  kind	  of	  overman’	  
(A:4).	  Modern	  morality	   is	   simply	  wrong	   about	  what	   sorts	   of	   individual	   are	   of	   value,	  whereas	   his	   own	  
evaluative	  standpoint	  gets	  things	  right.	  	  He	  seems	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  assumption	  that	  his	  belief	  in	  the	  
superiority	   of	   his	   own	   evaluative	   position	   admits	   of	   some	   sort	   of	   objective	   grounding	   –	   in	   the	   same	  
section	   of	   the	   same	   work,	   he	   tells	   us	   that	   modern	   morality’s	   belief	   that	   the	   European	   of	   today	  
represents	   a	   moral	   progression	   from	   the	   European	   of	   the	   Renaissance	   is	   based	   on	   a	   ‘false	   idea’,	  
indicating	  that	  he	  regards	  his	  own	  evaluative	  judgments	  as	  somehow	  epistemically	  privileged.	  	  
But	  this	  seems	  in	  direct	  conflict	  with	  his	  commitment	  to	  some	  form	  of	  antirealism	  about	  value.	  In	  TI	  VIII:	  
1,	  for	   instance,	  he	  declares	  that	  ‘there	  are	  altogether	  no	  moral	  facts’	  (TI	  VIII:	  1).	   If	  there	  were	  no	  facts	  
regarding	  the	  relative	  value	  of	  things,	  then	  there	  could	  no	  facts	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  some	  things	  could	  be	  
rightly	  said	  to	  be	  of	  greater	  value	  than	  others,	  and	  Nietzsche	  would	  have	  no	  grounds	  for	  supposing	  that	  
his	  own	  evaluative	  position	  was	  more	  correct	  or	  better	  justified	  than	  those	  he	  rejects.	  Since	  this	  tension	  
has	  the	  potential	  to	  render	  a	  key	  area	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  thought	   incoherent,	   it	  behooves	  us	  to	  determine	  
whether	  it	   is	  real	  or	  merely	  apparent.	  Is	  Nietzsche	  really	  an	  antirealist	  about	  value?	  If	  he	  is,	  then	  what	  
precisely	   is	   scope	  of	   his	   antirealism?	  That	   is,	   is	   he	   an	   antirealist	   only	  with	   regards	   to	   certain	   types	  of	  
value,	   or	   with	   regards	   to	   all	   value?	   This	   study	   will	   conclude	   that	   the	   tension	   is	   merely	   apparent	   –	  
Nietzsche	   is	   an	   antirealist	   only	  with	   respect	   to	  moral	   value,	   and	   his	   claims	   about	   the	   value	   of	   higher	  
types	  are	  to	  be	  construed	  as	   imputing	  non-­‐moral	  value.	   	   It	   is	  hoped,	   for	  the	  present,	   that	  the	  need	  to	  
offer	  an	  account	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  metaethics	  has	  been	  demonstrated.	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It	   is	   important,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   determining	  whether	   Nietzsche	   subscribed	   to	   error	   theory	   about	  
moral	   judgment,	   to	   gain	   a	   more	   precise	   understanding	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   view.	   According	   to	  
Nadeem	  Hussain,	  whose	  sensible	  and	  illuminating	  analysis	  we	  shall	  accept	  here,	  	  
An	  error	  theory	  is	  a	  conjunction	  of	  two	  claims,	  one	  semantic	  and	  the	  other	  substantive.	  The	  first	  
claim	   is	   that	  of	  cognitivism.	  Moral	  claims	  are	   truth-­‐apt;	   they	  are	   true	  or	   false.	  Moral	   judgments	  
are	   then	   taken	   to	   express	   beliefs.	   The	   second	   claim	   is	   that	   such	   moral	   claims,	   and	   thus	   the	  
relevant	  beliefs,	  are	  systemically	  false.	  Given	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  moral	  claims	  have,	  it	  turns	  out	  
the	  world	  is	  not	  the	  way	  these	  claims	  say	  it	  is1.	  	  
Error	  theory	  hence	  combines	  the	  view	  that	  moral	  claims	  state	  beliefs	  with	  the	  view	  that	  has	  traditionally	  
been	  called	  ‘moral	  antirealism’	  –	  the	  view	  that	  no	  such	  entities	  as	  moral	  properties	  exist.	  Having	  made	  
clear	   the	   theoretical	   commitments	   from	   which	   the	   error	   theorist’s	   central	   claim	   issues,	   we	   are	   now	  
better	   placed	   to	   ascertain	   whether	   Nietzsche	   was	   himself	   adherent	   to	   the	   view.	   In	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  
chapter,	   I	   show	  that	  evidence	  of	  a	  commitment	   to	  both	  cognitivism	  about	  moral	   judgment	  and	  moral	  
antirealism	  can	  be	  found	  throughout	  the	  Nietzschean	  corpus	  –	  that	  is,	  in	  both	  his	  earlier	  and	  later	  works.	  
In	   some	  places,	   the	  error	   theoretic	   conclusion	   that	  moral	   judgments	  are	   inescapably	  mired	   in	  error	   is	  
even	  stated	  quite	  explicitly.	  This	  last	  feature	  is	  vital	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  error	  theoretic	  interpretation,	  
since	  it	  might	  well	  be	  possible	  for	  someone	  to	  hold	  a	  number	  of	  views	  without	  endorsing	  the	  conclusion	  
they	  entail	  when	  taken	  together;	  being	  both	  a	  cogntivist	  about	  moral	  judgment	  and	  a	  moral	  antirealist	  
alone	  would	  not	  suffice	  to	  make	  Nietzsche	  an	  error	  theorist.	  To	  be	  the	  latter,	  he	  must	  recognize	  that	  the	  
error	  theoretic	  thesis	  follows	  from	  the	  claims	  the	  two	  views	  make	  and	  show	  signs	  of	  actively	  asserting	  it.	  	  
Daybreak,	   the	   work	   described	   by	   Nietzsche	   as	   marking	   the	   start	   of	   his	   campaign	   against	   morality,	  
contains	  a	  number	  of	  sections	  which	  strike	  one	  as	  rather	  unequivocal	  statements	  of	  error	  theory	  about	  
moral	  belief	  and	  judgment.	  The	  earliest	  of	  these,	  section	  3,	   likens	  moral	   judgments,	   in	  respect	  of	  their	  
veridicality,	  to	  the	  primitive	  –	  but,	  he	  claims,	  presently	  lingering	  –	  judgment	  that	  all	  objects	  are	  properly	  
assigned	   a	   sexual	   status.	   It	   then	   proceeds	   to	   issue	   the	   bold	   prediction	   that	   any	   belief	   in	   the	   moral	  
significance	   of	   things	   –	   facts,	   acts,	   states	   of	   affairs,	   etc.	   –	  will	   eventually	   (presumably,	   in	   some	   post-­‐
moral	   epoch)	   prove	   to	   be	   of	   no	   greater	   value	   than	   the	   presently	   discredited	   beliefs	   regarding	   the	  
masculinity	  or	   femininity	  of	  objects	   like	   the	   sun.	  Nietzsche	   leaves	   the	   sense	  of	   the	   term	   ‘value’	   as	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Hussain,	  Nadeem	  J.Z.,	  ‘Valuing	  for	  Nietzsche’s	  Free	  Spirits’,	  in	  Brian	  Leiter	  and	  Neil	  Sinhababu	  (ed.),	  Nietzsche	  and	  Morality,	  
Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  p	  160.	  	  
5	  
	  
employs	  it	  here	  ambiguous	  between	  epistemic	  value	  and	  practical	  worth.	  But	  a	  strong	  hint	  as	  to	  which	  
sense	  is	  intended	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  lines	  which	  precede	  those	  that	  state	  the	  prediction:	  
When	  man	  gave	  all	   things	  a	  sex	  he	  thought	  (…)	  he	  had	  gained	  a	  profound	   insight:	  -­‐it	  was	  only	  
very	  late	  that	  he	  confessed	  to	  himself	  what	  an	  enormous	  error	  this	  was	  (…).	  –	  In	  the	  same	  way	  
man	  has	  ascribed	  to	  all	  that	  exists	  a	  connection	  with	  morality	  and	  laid	  an	  ethical	  significance	  on	  
the	  world’s	  back.	  (D:	  3)	  
The	  analogy	  between	  judgments	  which	  ascribe	  to	  things	  a	  sex	  and	  moral	  judgments	  is	  instructive.	  First,	  
it	   tells	   us	   that	  Nietzsche	   is	   a	   cognitivist	   about	  moral	   judgments.	  Moral	   judgments	   ascribe	   to	   things	   a	  
connection	  with	  morality	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  judgments	  regarding	  the	  sexual	  status	  of	  things	  ascribe	  a	  
sex	   to	   things.	   Both	   classes	   of	   judgment	   describe	   things	   as	   objectively	   possessing	   a	   certain	   type	   of	  
property,	   and	  both	   fail	   to	   report	   things	   as	   they	   truly	   are,	   for,	   just	   as	  many	   things	   do	  not	   have	   a	   sex,	  
nothing	  truly	  enjoys	  ‘a	  connection	  with	  morality’	  or	  has	  ‘an	  ethical	  significance’;	  the	  passage	  also	  tells	  us	  
that	  Nietzsche	  was	  committed	  to	  antirealism	  about	  both	  sex	  where	  certain	  objects	  were	  concerned,	  and	  
the	  moral.	  And	   it	  also	  appears	   to	   state	   rather	  directly	   the	  central	  error	   theoretic	   claim.	   In	   saying	   that	  
man’s	  assigning	  all	  things	  a	  sex	  involved	  ‘an	  enormous	  error’,	  and	  that	  moral	  judgment	  and	  discourse	  fall	  
into	  the	  same	  trap,	  Nietzsche	  is	  surely	  expressing	  the	  view	  that	  such	  judgment	  and	  discourse,	  insofar	  as	  
it	  reads	  into	  the	  world	  a	  type	  of	  significance	  that	  is	  really	  illusory,	  is	  guilty	  of	  systematic	  error.	  	  
Section	   103	   of	   the	   same	   work	   also	   lends	   strong	   support	   to	   the	   error	   theoretic	   interpretation.	   Here,	  
Nietzsche	   distinguishes	   between	   ‘two	   kinds	   of	   deniers	   of	  morality’.	   The	   first,	   he	   tells	   us,	   denies	   that	  
motivating	   reasons	   which	   issue	   in	   action	   are	   ever	   moral	   reasons.	   Moral	   considerations,	   despite	   our	  
claims	   that	   they	  were	  efficacious	   in	  moving	  us	   to	  action,	  never	  motivate	  us	  sufficiently	   to	  be	   the	   true	  
causes	  of	  the	   latter.	  Like	  La	  Rochefoucald,	  who	  Nietzsche	  cites	  as	  an	  example	  of	  this	  type	  of	  denier	  of	  
morality,	  he	  might	  insist	  that	  only	  selfish	  (and	  hence,	   immoral)	  motives	  ever	  result	  in	  action.	  Nietzsche	  
informs	   us	   that	   despite	   recognizing	  many	   cases	   in	  which	   nonmoral	   or	   immoral	  motives	   exert	   greater	  
influence	  over	  people’s	  actions	  than	  moral	  motives,	  he	  does	  not	  consider	  himself	  a	  denier	  of	  morality	  in	  
this	  sense.	  He	  then	  introduces	  the	  second	  kind	  of	  denier	  of	  morality	  –	  the	  individual	  who	  accepts	  that	  
moral	  considerations,	  or	  judgments,	  often	  are	  the	  actual	  motives	  of	  acts	  that	  we	  do	  end	  up	  performing,	  
but	  who	  denies	   that	  moral	   judgments	   ‘are	  based	  on	   truths’,	   and	  holds	   that	   ‘it	   is	  errors	  which,	   as	   the	  
basis	  of	  all	  moral	  judgment,	  impel	  men	  to	  their	  moral	  actions	  (emphasis	  mine)’	  (D:	  103).	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Nietzsche’s	  description	  of	  his	  second	  type	  of	  denier	  of	  morality	  seems	  strikingly	   like	   that	  of	   the	  moral	  
error	  theorist.	  The	  denial	  that	  moral	  judgments	  are	  ‘based	  on	  truths’	  appears	  to	  echo	  the	  error	  theoretic	  
claim	   that	   such	   judgments	   are	   uniformly	   false,	   or	   fail	   to	   accurately	   represent	   the	   world.	   It	   might	   be	  
argued,	  against	  such	  a	  reading,	  that	  there	  remains	  room	  here	  for	  construing	  the	  denial	  as	  an	  expression	  
of	   the	  non-­‐cognitivist	   claim	   that	  moral	   judgments	  do	  not	  primarily	  aim	  at	   stating	   truths.	  According	   to	  
moral	   non-­‐cognitivists,	   moral	   judgments	   have	   two	   types	   of	   semantic	   content:	   descriptive	   and	  
expressive.	  And	  it	  is	  in	  the	  latter	  type	  of	  content	  that	  the	  primary	  meaning	  of	  these	  judgments	  is	  to	  be	  
sought.	   But	   since	   a	   moral	   judgment’s	   expressive	   content	   –	   its	   principal	   content	   –	   does	   not	   seek	   to	  
represent	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is,	  or	  to	  aim	  at	  truth,	  but	  to	  express	  various	  non-­‐cognitive	  attitudes,	  there	  is	  a	  
sense	  in	  which	  the	  judgment	  is	  not	  based	  on	  truth,	  and	  this	  part	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  description	  of	  the	  second	  
type	   of	   denier	   of	   morality	   (and	   the	   type	   of	   denier	   of	   morality	   that	   he	   himself	   is)	   can	   be	   rendered	  
consistent	  with	  that	  of	  a	  moral	  non-­‐cognitivist.	  	  
But	   the	  next	  part	  of	   the	  description	   is,	   undoubtedly,	   resistant	   to	   such	   finessing.	  Nietzsche	  goes	  on	   to	  
write	  that,	  for	  such	  deniers	  of	  morality,	  ‘it	  is	  errors	  which,	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  moral	  judgment,	  impel	  men	  
to	   their	  moral	   actions’.	   Their	   view	   that	   error	   forms	   the	   basis	   of	   all	  moral	   judgment	   implies	   that	   they	  
regard	  the	  latter	  as	  capable	  of	  truth	  or	  falsity,	  or	  truth-­‐apt.	  And	  moral	  non-­‐cognitivism	  is	  precisely	  the	  
view	  that	  moral	   judgments	  primarily	  express	  non-­‐cognitive	  states	  of	  mind	  and	  hence	  are	   incapable	  of	  
being	   true	   or	   false.	   The	   assumption	   of	   such	   a	   denier	   of	  morality	   that	  moral	   judgments	   are	   truth-­‐apt	  
betrays	   his	   cognitivist	   commitments.	   It	   is,	   furthermore,	   obvious	   from	   Nietzsche’s	   description	   that	  
someone	  who	  denies	  morality	   in	   this	   sense	   regards	   these	   judgments	  not	   just	  as	   truth-­‐apt,	  but	  also	  as	  
false:	  	  error	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  moral	  judgment,	  or	  a	  feature	  which	  plagues	  all	  such	  judgment.	  	  ‘Deny	  that	  
moral	   judgments	  are	  based	  on	   truths’	  must	  be	   taken	   to	  mean	   ‘deny	   that	   the	  claims	  moral	   judgments	  
make	  are	  true	  of	  the	  world’.	  Nietzsche’s	  second	  way	  of	  denying	  morality	  appears	  to	  be	  to	  embrace	  error	  
theory.	  And	  he	  then	  proceeds	  to	  profess	  that	  he	  himself	  denies	  morality	  in	  precisely	  this	  way.	  Like	  these	  
other	  thinkers	  whose	  view	  he	  has	  been	  clarifying,	  he	  holds	  that	  moral	  judgments	  have	  no	  basis	  in	  truth,	  
that	  they	  are	  all	  plagued	  by	  error.	  He	  does	  not	  resist	   the	  suggestion	  that	  moral	   judgments	  sometimes	  
successfully	  motivate	  action,	  but	  insists	  that	  they	  are	  invariably	  judgments	  that	  are	  mistaken	  about	  the	  
way	  things	  are.	  If	  the	  second	  type	  of	  denier	  of	  morality	  is	  really	  an	  error	  theorist,	  and	  counts	  Nietzsche	  
among	  his	  ranks,	  then	  Nietzsche	  must	  be	  an	  error	  theorist.	  	  
Nietzsche’s	   choice	   of	   analogy	   a	   little	   later	   in	   the	   section	   to	   further	   clarify	  what	   his	   denial	   of	  morality	  
amounts	   to	   is	   also	   instructive.	   He	   tells	   us	   that	   he	   denies	   morality	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   he	   denies	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alchemy:	   ‘I	   deny	   their	   premises’.	   Alchemy	   had	   by	  Nietzsche’s	   day	   come	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   pseudo-­‐
science,	   a	   discourse	   involving	   various	   descriptions	   propositions	   whose	   claim	   to	   truth	   was	   extremely	  
dubious.	   Such	   claims	   included	   propositions	   concerning	   how	   the	   coveted	   elixir	   known	   as	   the	  
philosopher’s	  stone	  could	  be	  produced	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  transform	  any	  base	  metal	   in	  gold	  and	  prolong	  
life	   indefinitely.	   Although	  we	  who	   are	   under	   the	   influence	   of	  modern	   science	   no	   longer	   believe	   that	  
alchemy’s	   ‘premises’	  or	  propositions	  accurately	  describe	  various	  aspects	  of	   the	  world,	  we	  nonetheless	  
concede	  that	  they	  purport	   to	  do	  so.	  Despite	  alchemy’s	   failure	  with	  regards	  to	  veridicality,	   it	   remains	  a	  
cognitive	  enterprise.	  Its	  claims	  are	  capable	  of	  truth	  or	  falsity,	  though	  they	  turn	  out	  largely	  false	  due	  to	  
their	  content	  and	  the	  real	  nature	  of	  the	  world	  they	  aim	  to	  describe.	  	  
That	  Nietzsche	   regards	   his	   stance	   toward	  morality	   as	   analogous	   to	   his	   stance	   toward	   alchemy	   shows	  
that	  he	  views	  both	  discourses	  as	  fact-­‐stating.	  If	  he	  denies	  morality	  as	  he	  denies	  alchemy,	  and	  he	  denies	  
alchemy	  by	  way	  of	  denying	  that	  any	  of	  its	  descriptive	  claims	  are	  true,	  then	  he	  must	  also	  deny	  morality	  
by	   resisting	   the	   belief	   that	   its	   claims,	   though	   descriptive,	   attain	   to	   truth.	   He	   must	   be	   committed	   to	  
cognitivism	   about	   moral	   judgment.	   And	   this,	   combined	   with	   his	   conviction	   that	   the	   latter,	   like	   the	  
judgments	   constitutive	   of	   the	   discourse	   of	   alchemy,	   never	   state	   facts	   that	   actually	   obtain,	   leaves	   no	  
room	  for	  doubt	  with	  regards	  to	  his	  error	  theoretic	  commitments.	  	  
Towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  same	  section,	  he	  tells	  us	  that	  people	  who	  feel	  themselves	  to	  be	  immoral	  have	  no	  
reason	  to	  do	  so:	  
I	   also	  deny	   immorality:	  not	   that	   countless	  people	   feel	   themselves	   to	  be	   immoral,	  but	   that	  
there	  is	  any	  true	  reason	  so	  to	  feel.	  	  (D:	  103)	  
Attributing	   to	   him	   an	   error	   theory	   about	  moral	   judgment	  would	   enable	   us	   to	  make	   perfect	   sense	   of	  
these	   lines	   –	   his	   denial	   of	   immorality	   here	   appears	   to	  be	   readily	   translatable	   into	   the	   error	   theorist’s	  
denial	  that	  anybody	  who	  believes	  that	  various	  acts	  of	  his	  own	  or	  of	  others	  are	  morally	  wrong	  is	  guilty	  of	  
cognitive	  error.	  As	  an	  error	  theorist,	  Nietzsche	  would	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  people	  who	  felt	  
themselves	  to	  be	  immoral	  lacked	  ‘any	  true	  reason	  so	  to	  feel’.	  If	  no	  moral	  facts	  existed,	  then	  there	  would	  
no	   fact	   of	   the	   matter	   as	   to	   whether	   any	   act	   performed	   was	   right	   or	   wrong,	   or	   as	   to	   whether	   any	  
intention	   or	   character	   trait	  was	   (morally)	   good	   or	   bad.	   And	   anybody	  who	   believed	   that	   he	   had	   done	  
something	   morally	   wrong	   would	   be	   mistaken	   because	   nothing	   about	   the	   world	   renders	   the	   act	   in	  
question	  wrong.	  Nietzsche’s	  cognitivist	  language	  in	  these	  lines	  is	  also	  unmistakable	  –	  he	  must	  surely	  be	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seen	  here	  as	  denying	  the	  truth	  of	  judgments	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  any	  acts	  are	  immoral,	  or	  as	  denying	  that	  
there	  is	  any	  reason	  to	  regard	  them	  as	  true.	  As	  such,	  he	  must	  be	  a	  cognitivist	  concerning	  moral	  discourse.	  	  
Nietzsche’s	  next	  work,	  The	  Gay	   Science,	   also	   shows	  evidence	  of	   commitment	   to	  error	   theory.	   Section	  
109,	  which	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	   familiar	  Nietzschean	   (and	  Neo-­‐Kantian)	   theme	   regarding	   the	   actual	  
world	  being	  nothing	  like	  the	  world	  we	  know,	  declares	  that	  ‘None	  of	  our	  aesthetic	  and	  moral	  judgments	  	  
apply	   to	   (the	  world	  as	   it	   is	   in	   itself)’	   (GS:	  109).	  The	  sentence	  and	   its	  context	  suggest	   two	  things	  about	  
Nietzsche’s	   view	   of	  moral	   judgments.	   First,	   it	   indicates	   that	   the	   latter	   are	  meant	   by	   those	  who	   issue	  
them	  to	  ‘apply	  to’,	  or	  to	  represent,	  the	  world.	  For	  the	  general	  thrust	  of	  the	  section	  in	  which	  it	  occurs	  is	  
that	  most	  of	  the	  descriptive	  judgments	  we	  naively	  take	  to	  be	  true	  of	  the	  world	  are	  in	  fact	  false,	  and	  that	  
our	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  is	  in	  dire	  need	  of	  ‘naturalization’.	  Its	  treatment	  of	  moral	  judgments	  as	  a	  
type	   of	   descriptive	   judgment	   about	   the	   world	   tells	   us	   that	   Nietzsche	   saw	   them	   as	   cognitive	   or	  
representational.	  	  
Second,	   it	   reveals	   once	   again	   that	   he	   regarded	   them	   as	   fundamentally	   mistaken,	   or	   as	   failing	   to	  
accurately	  depict	  reality.	  This	  must	  surely	  be	  the	  meaning	  of	  his	  claim	  that	  moral	  judgments	  fail	  to	  apply	  
to	  the	  world.	   Indeed,	  given	  that	  the	  view	  that	  Nietzsche	  wants	  the	  section	  to	   implant	   in	  his	  readers	   is	  
that	  the	  world	  itself	  is	  such	  that	  our	  most	  cherished	  judgments	  –	  including	  moral	  judgments	  –	  turn	  out	  
false,	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  read	  him	  as	  expressing	  an	  error	  theory	  about	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  descriptive	  claims,	  
moral	  judgments	  included.	  	  	  
In	   the	  next	   to	   last	  of	  his	  works	   to	  be	  published	  before	  his	  descent	   into	  mental	   illness	   (Twilight	  of	   the	  
Idols),	   Nietzsche	   issues	   a	   demand	   which	   he	   takes	   to	   have	   been	   a	   recurring	   theme	   of	   his	   work:	   that	  
philosophers	   cease	   to	   judge	  morally,	   or	   to	   see	   the	   world	   in	   moral	   terms.	   The	   justification	   he	   then	  
proceeds	  to	  offer	  for	  this	  demand	  reads	  like	  a	  statement	  of	  the	  central	  claim	  of	  moral	  antirealism,	  the	  
claim	  that	  there	  exist	  no	  objective	  moral	  facts	  or	  properties.	  	  
My	  demand	  upon	  the	  philosopher	  is	  known,	  that	  he	  take	  his	  stand	  beyond	  good	  and	  evil	  and	  
leave	  the	  illusion	  of	  moral	   judgment	  beneath	  himself.	  This	  demand	  follows	  from	  an	  insight	  
that	  I	  was	  the	  first	  to	  formulate:	  that	  there	  are	  altogether	  no	  moral	  facts.	  (TI	  VII:	  1)	  




Moral	   judgments	   agree	   with	   religious	   ones	   in	   believing	   in	   realities	   which	   are	   no	   realities	  
(emphasis	   mine).	   Morality	   is	   merely	   an	   interpretation	   of	   certain	   phenomena	   –	   more	  
precisely,	   a	   misinterpretation.	   Moral	   judgments,	   like	   religious	   ones,	   belong	   to	   a	   stage	   of	  
ignorance	   at	  which	   the	   very	   concept	   between	  what	   is	   real	   and	  what	   is	   imaginary	   are	   still	  
lacking;	   thus	   ‘truth,’	   at	   this	   stage,	   designates	   all	   sorts	   of	   things	   which	   we	   today	   call	  
‘imaginings.’	  (TI	  VII:	  1)	  
Nietzsche’s	   characterization	   of	   moral	   judgments	   as	   (like	   their	   religious	   counterparts)	   ‘believing	   in	  
realities	  which	  are	  no	  realities’	  leaves	  no	  doubt	  about	  both	  his	  views	  regarding	  their	  semantic	  function	  
and	   their	   veridicality.	   Indeed,	   every	   subsequent	   line	   in	   the	   passage	   quoted	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	  
reiteration	   of	   these	   views.	   Since	  moral	   judgments	   believe	   in	   certain	   realities,	   they	  must,	   for	   him,	   be	  
cognitive.	   Of	   course,	   it	   is	   not	   our	   moral	   judgments,	   but	   we,	   who	   believe	   in	   these	   realities,	   and	   the	  
former	  serve	  to	  express	  these	  beliefs.	  But	  Nietzsche’s	  meaning	  is	  clear.	  Moral	  judgments	  are	  obviously	  –	  
for	  him	  at	  least	  –	  representational.	  They	  represent	  the	  world	  as	  being	  a	  certain	  way,	  and	  thus	  can	  turn	  
out	   true	  or	   false.	   They	   are	   true	   if	   the	  world	   is	   indeed	   as	   they	  describe	   it	   to	   be,	   that	   is,	   as	   containing	  
moral	   realities	   or	   facts	   or	   properties,	   and	   false	   if	   it	   is	   otherwise.	   Nietzsche’s	   warning	   that	   moral	  
judgments,	  despite	  claiming	  for	  themselves	  the	  status	  of	  ‘truth(s)’,	  make	  reference	  ‘to	  all	  sorts	  of	  things	  
which	  we	  today	  call	  imaginings’,	  tells	  us	  that	  they,	  for	  him,	  at	  least	  aspire	  to	  truth.	  	  
And	  it	  is	  equally	  certain	  that	  these	  judgments	  turn	  out	  false	  on	  his	  view	  –	  the	  realities	  they	  present	  ‘are	  
no	  realities’.	  He	  denounces	  morality	  not	  just	  as	  mere	  ‘interpretation’,	  but	  as	  ‘misinterpretation’.	  By	  this	  
he	  presumably	  means	  that	  they	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  reality	  that	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  misguided,	  or	  to	  describe	  
it	  inaccurately.	  And	  if	  moral	  judgments	  believe	  in	  and	  seek	  to	  describe	  realities	  that	  turn	  out	  not	  to	  exist,	  
then	  they	  must	  end	  up	  being	  falsehoods.	  So	  both	  structural	  elements	  of	  error	  theory	  find	  expression	  in	  
the	   passage:	   cognitivism	   about	   moral	   judgments,	   and	   moral	   antirealism,	   as	   does	   the	   main	   error	  
theoretic	  claim	  that	  cognitive	  error	  thoroughly	  pervades	  moral	  judgment.	  	  
Nietzsche’s	  demand	  that	  philosophers	  ‘take	  their	  stand	  beyond	  good	  and	  evil’	  would	  also	  make	  perfect	  
sense	  if	  he	  were	  an	  error	  theorist.	  For	  the	  error	  theorist	  views	  moral	  judgments	  as	  uniformly	  false,	  and,	  
assuming	  that	  he	  accepted	  the	  normative	  implications	  of	  a	  judgment’s	  epistemic	  status	  like	  most	  of	  the	  
rest	  of	  us,	  would	  likely	  recommend	  that	  we	  give	  up	  making	  moral	  judgments	  altogether.	  Of	  course,	  he	  
might,	   despite	  maintaining	   the	   systematic	   falsity	   of	  moral	   judgments,	   insist	   that	  we	   continue	  making	  
them	  for	  non-­‐epistemic	  reasons	   (the	  route	  taken	  by	  the	  most	  celebrated	  of	  contemporary	  moral	  error	  
theorists,	  J.	  L.	  Mackie).	  But,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  countervailing	  reasons,	  we	  should	  fully	  expect	  him	  to	  urge	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us	   towards	   rising	  above	  making	  and	  abiding	  by	  moral	   judgments.	  And	   this	   is	  precisely	  what	  Nietzsche	  
appears	   to	  be	  doing	  when	  he	  urges	  us	   to	  position	  ourselves	   ‘beyond	  good	  and	  evil’,	  and	   ‘to	   leave	  the	  
illusion	  of	  moral	   judgment	  beneath	  [us].’	  His	  claim	  that	  his	  demand	   is	  entailed	  by	  the	  nonexistence	  of	  
moral	  facts	  is	  just	  the	  sort	  of	  claim	  that	  we	  might	  expect	  someone	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  error	  theory	  to	  
make.	  This	  gives	  us	  further	  reason	  to	  accept	  the	  error	  theoretic	  interpretation.	  	  	  
Clark	  and	  Dudrick’s	  non-­‐cognitivist	  reading	  
An	   important	   rival	   reading	   to	   have	   emerged	   in	   recent	   years	   is	   that	   of	   Maudmarie	   Clark	   and	   David	  
Dudrick.	   In	  a	  2006	  paper	   (in	  Leiter	  and	  Sinhababu	  2007)2,	   they	  note	  three	  features	  of	   the	  Gay	  Science	  
which,	  they	  claim,	  give	  us	  good	  reason	  to	  ascribe	  to	  Nietzsche	  a	  non-­‐cognitivist	  metaethics.	  The	  first	  of	  
these	   features	   is	   the	  more	   accommodating,	   at	   times	   even	   laudatory,	   stance	   the	  work	   adopts	   toward	  
evaluative	   discourse.	  While	   certain	   earlier	   works,	   such	   as	  Human,	   All	   Too	   Human,	   are	   unrelenting	   in	  
their	   censure	   of	  moral	   discourse	   for	   presenting	   as	   real	   the	   illusory	  world	   of	   values,	   The	  Gay	   Science,	  
Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  point	  out,	  ‘celebrates	  [this]	  world	  as	  a	  human	  creation,	  rather	  than	  looking	  down	  on	  it	  
as	   an	   error’	   (Clark	   and	   Dudrick	   2006).	   This	   striking	   shift	   in	   Nietzsche’s	   attitude	   toward	   evaluative	  
discourse	  cannot,	  they	  suggest,	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  newly	  acquired	  commitment	  to	  some	  form	  of	  realism,	  
for	  Nietzsche	  remains	  as	  insistent	  in	  this	  work	  as	  before	  that	  ‘Whatever	  has	  value	  in	  our	  world	  now	  does	  
not	  have	  value	  in	  itself,	  according	  to	  its	  nature	  –	  nature	  is	  aways	  value-­‐less(…)’	  (GS	  301).	  	  
And	  it	  seems	  to	  signal	  an	  abandonment	  of	  his	  earlier	  error	  theoretic	  position,	  for	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  
Nietzsche	  would	  have	  suddenly	  become	  so	  well-­‐disposed	  toward	  evaluative	  discourse	  if	  he	  still	  regarded	  
it	  as	  cognitive,	  but	  mired	  in	  falsehood.	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  suggest	  that	  attributing	  to	  the	  Nietzsche	  of	  The	  
Gay	   Science	   a	   non-­‐cognitive	   metaethics	   would	   explain	   his	   change	   in	   attitude	   viz-­‐a-­‐vis	   evaluative	  
judgments	  –	   if	  Nietzsche	  no	   longer	   saw	   their	   function	  as	  descriptive	   (and	   false)	   and	   instead	   regarded	  
them	  as	  expressions	  of	  various	  non-­‐cognitive	  attitudes,	  then	  he	  would,	  prima	  facie,	  have	  less	  reason	  to	  
view	   them	  with	   contempt	   –	  while	  maintaining	   consistency	   in	   relation	   to	   his	   continued	   affirmation	   of	  
metaethical	  antirealism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Clark,	  Maudmarie	  and	  Dudrick,	  David	  (2007),	  “Nietzsche	  and	  Moral	  Objectivity”,	  in	  Brian	  Leiter	  and	  Neil	  Sinhababu	  




The	  next	  feature	  of	  the	  work	  which	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  rely	  on	  in	  defending	  their	  reading	  occurs	  in	  section	  
299,	  titled	  ‘What	  One	  Should	  Learn	  from	  Artists’.	  Specifically,	  they	  appeal	  to	  the	  supposed	  implications	  
of	  a	  question	  he	  issues	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  that	  section,	  ‘How	  can	  we	  make	  things	  beautiful,	  attractive	  
and	   desirable	   for	   us	  when	   they	   are	   not?	   And	   I	   rather	   think	   that	   in	   themselves	   they	   never	   are’.	   They	  
argue	   that	   Nietzsche’s	   posing	   it	   is	   incompatible	   with	   his	   being	   an	   error	   theorist,	   for	   the	   question	  
concerns	   how	  we	   can	  make	   things	   be	   beautiful,	   attractive	   and	   desirable,	   rather	   than	   how	  we	  might	  
make	   things	   appear	   thus	   to	   us,	   or	   how	  we	  might	  merely	  make	   people	   believe	   that	   they	   have	   these	  
features.	  	  
If	  Nietzsche	  were	  an	  error	  theorist,	  then	  his	  question	  ought	  to	  mean	  the	  latter,	  since,	  according	  to	  error	  
theory,	   things	   never	   have	   such	   features	   in	   themselves	   (but	   we	   believe	   they	   do,	   and	   evaluative	  
judgments	  express	  this	  belief,	  thereby	  falling	  into	  error).	  Since	  things	  themselves	  never	  possess	  beauty,	  
attractiveness	  and	  desirability,	  the	  question	  can	  never,	  for	  the	  error	  theorist,	  be	  how	  to	  make	  them	  be	  
such	  as	  to	  possess	  these	  qualities.	  The	  only	  relevant	  question	  he	  might	  consistently	  ask	  is	  how	  to	  make	  
us	  (erroneously)	  judge	  or	  believe	  that	  they	  are	  such.	  But,	  since	  that	  is	  clearly	  not	  Nietzsche’s	  question,	  
which	  seems	  rather	  to	  be	  how	  we	  can	  make	  things	  themselves	  beautiful,	  attractive	  and	  desirable	  (the	  
very	  question	  denied	   to	   the	  error	   theorist),	   the	  metaethical	   view	  he	   is	   committed	   to	   cannot	  be	  error	  
theory.	   	   Clark	   and	   Dudrick	   then	   briefly	   consider	   the	   subjective	   realist	   reading	   (on	   which	   Nietzsche	  
emerges	  as	  believing	  that	  things	  acquire	  evaluative	  properties	  only	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  valued	  or	  abhorred	  
by	  individuals)	  offered	  by	  Schacht	  and	  reject	  it	  in	  favour	  of	  their	  own	  non-­‐cognitivist	  reading,	  regarding	  
the	  latter	  as	  best	  able	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  question	  which	  occupies	  Nietzsche	  in	  section	  299.	  
Lastly,	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  argue	   that	  Nietzsche’s	  proposed	  answer	   to	   the	  question	   reflects	  metaethical	  
non-­‐cognitivism’s	   view	   of	   the	   role	   and	   action	   of	   evaluative	   discourse.	   His	   suggestion	   that	  we	   borrow	  
from	  artists	  their	  ways	  of	  manipulating	  perspectives	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  in	  people	  ‘certain	  reactions’	  or	  
‘passions’	   regarding	   things,	   they	   seem	   to	   think,	   is	   inconsistent	   with	   error	   theory.	   For	   evaluative	  
discourse,	   for	   Nietzsche,	  mirrors	   artistic	   creation	   and	   endeavour	   in	   essentially	   seeking	   to	   produce	   in	  
people	  emotions,	  passions	  and	  various	  other	  non-­‐cognitive	  states,	  and	  such	  a	  view	  seems	  to	  have	  little	  
in	  common	  with	  error	  theory,	  which	  sees	  evaluative	  discourse	  as	  constituted	  by	  belief	  and	  description.	  
In	  what	  follows,	   I	  examine	   in	  turn	  the	  three	  considerations	  which	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  claim	  favour	  their	  
reading,	  and	  show	  that	  none	  of	  them	  actually	  do	  so.	  	  
We	  now	  revisit	  their	  first	  argument,	  which	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  as	  follows:	  by	  the	  time	  Nietzsche	  came	  to	  
write	  The	  Gay	  Science,	  his	  stance	  toward	  evaluative	  discourse	  had	  been	  subject	  to	  a	  complete	  reversal	  –	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rather	  than	  denouncing	  it	  for	  erroneously	  depicting	  reality	  as	  imbued	  with	  value,	  he	  now	  celebrated	  it	  
‘as	  a	  human	  creation’.	   Such	  a	   shift	   could,	   it	   seems,	  be	  accounted	   for	  only	  by	  a	   change	   in	  metaethical	  
view;	   if	   Nietzsche	   had	   continued	   to	   regard	   evaluative	   judgments	   as	   truth-­‐apt,	   and,	   furthermore,	   as	  
never	  stating	  the	  truth	  (that	  is,	  continued	  to	  hold	  an	  error	  theory	  about	  such	  judgments),	  then	  he	  could	  
not	   have	   come	   to	   shed	  his	   revulsion	   and	   look	  upon	   them	   so	   favourably.	   	   The	  only	  metaethical	   views	  
which	  might	  support	  a	  positive	  appraisal	  of	  evaluative	  discourse	  without	  rejecting	  the	  antirealism	  which	  
Nietzsche	  continued	  to	  explicitly	  endorse	  are	  non-­‐cognitivism	  and	  subjective	  realism.	  Since	  the	  latter	  is	  
problematic,	  Nietzsche	  is	  best	  read	  as	  a	  non-­‐cognitivist	  about	  evaluative	  judgment	  from	  The	  Gay	  Science	  
onwards.	  
Note	   that	   the	  success	  of	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick’s	  argument	   rests	  on	  1)	   the	  plausibility	  of	   their	  assumption	  
that	  Nietzsche	  could	  not	  have	  come	  to	  view	  evaluative	   judgment	   favourably	  while	   remaining	  an	  error	  
theorist,	   and	   2)	   the	   success	   of	   their	   attempt	   to	   dismiss	   subjective	   realism	   as	   a	   tenable	   rival	  
interpretation.	   If	   the	   error	   theoretic	   reading	   could	   account	   for	   Nietzsche’s	   change	   of	   heart	   about	  
evaluative	   discourse,	   then	   there	   would	   be	   little	   reason	   for	   advancing	   a	   different	   reading.	   And	   I	   now	  
show	  that	   it	  can.	  My	  attempt	  to	  do	  so	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  –	   I	  claim	  –	  well-­‐supported	  observation	  that	  
Nietzsche	  was	  committed	  to	  values	  other	  than	  epistemic	  value,	  and	  often	  regarded	  the	  authority	  of	  such	  
non-­‐epistemic	  values	  as	  exceeding	   that	  of	   the	   latter.	  This	  would	   leave	   the	  door	  open	   for	  Nietzsche	   to	  
propose	   that	   false	   judgments	   (evaluative	   judgments	   possibly	   included)	  might	   nonetheless	   be	  of	   great	  
value.	   If	  Nietzsche	  came	   to	   see	  evaluative	   judgments	  as	  possessing	   so	  much	  non-­‐epistemic	  value	   that	  
the	  non-­‐epistemic	  reasons	  for	  retaining	  them	  outweighed	  the	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  abandoning	  them,	  
then	   we	   need	   not	   represent	   him	   as	   giving	   up	   error	   theory	   in	   order	   to	   account	   for	   his	   newfound	  
admiration	  for	  them.	  	  
Let	  us	  elaborate	  on	  the	  foregoing.	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick’s	  suggestion	  that	  the	  change	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  attitude	  
toward	   evaluative	   discourse	   is	   most	   likely	   an	   indication	   of	   his	   having	   transcended	   the	   view	   that	   the	  
latter	  is	  cognitive	  in	  nature	  would	  seem	  quite	  plausible	  if	  his	  stance	  with	  regard	  to	  falsehood	  remained	  
unreservedly	   antagonistic	   throughout	   his	   philosophical	   life.	   If	   Nietzsche	   held	   an	   error	   theory	   and	  
consequently	  saw	  evaluative	   judgments	  as	  stating	  nothing	  but	  falsehoods,	  and,	   furthermore,	  regarded	  
falsity	  itself	  as	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  a	  negative	  valuation,	  then	  we	  might	  expect	  him	  to	  remain	  a	  firm	  critic	  
of	  such	  judgments.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  he	  remained	  an	  error	  theorist	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  believing	  
that	  a	   judgment	  could	  be	  of	  value	  despite	  being	  false,	  or,	   in	  other	  words,	   that	   its	  epistemic	  value	  was	  
not	  exhaustive	  of	  all	   its	  value,	   then	  he	  might	  nevertheless	  have	  reason	  to	  accord	  evaluative	   judgment	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positive	  value.	  He	  might	  then	  find	  himself	  having	  cause	  to	  give	  value	  judgments	  a	  positive	  appraisal,	  on	  
account	   of	   some	   non-­‐epistemic	   value	   that	   they	   possessed.	   Rather	   than	   appeal	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   his	  
metaethical	  views	  evolved	  significantly	  in	  explaining	  his	  newfound	  appreciation	  of	  evaluative	  discourse,	  
we	  might	  instead	  offer	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  latter	  development	  his	  (perhaps	  newly	  acquired)	  belief	  that	  
such	   discourse	   has	   value	   independent	   of	   its	   epistemic	   value,	   and	   that	   this	   non-­‐epistemic	   value	  more	  
than	  makes	  up	  for	  its	  falsity.	  	  
And	   there	   is	  much	   evidence	   that	  Nietzsche	   believed	   that	   judgments	   should	   not	   be	   assessed	   on	   their	  
epistemic	  merit	  alone.	  One	  of	  his	  most	  famous	  doctrines	  holds	  that	  judgments	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed	  
on	  account	  of	  their	  falsity	  alone,	  but	  also	  evaluated	  for	  their	  ability	  to	  contribute	  to	  human	  flourishing.	  
The	  view	  is	  articulated	  concisely	  in	  section	  4	  of	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil:	  	  
The	   falseness	   of	   a	   judgment	   is	   for	   us	   not	   necessarily	   an	   objection	   to	   a	   judgment;	   in	   this	  
respect	   our	   new	   language	  may	   sound	   strangest.	   The	   question	   is	   to	  what	   extent	   it	   is	   life-­‐
promoting,	  life-­‐preserving,	  species-­‐preserving,	  perhaps	  even	  species-­‐cultivating.	  And	  we	  are	  
fundamentally	   inclined	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   falsest	   judgments	   (which	   include	   the	   synthetic	  
judgments	  a	  priori)	  are	  the	  most	  indispensable	  to	  us(…	  )	  (BGE:	  4)	  
That	   is	   to	  say,	  a	   judgment	  can	  have	  value	   independent	  of	   its	  epistemic	  value	  –	  Nietzsche	   is	  proposing	  
that	  we	  bring	  a	  new	  criterion	  of	  value	  to	  bear	  on	  judgments,	  one	  which	  he	  suggests	  should	  be	  regarded	  
as	  more	  significant,	  as	  more	  determinative	  of	  a	  judgment’s	  final	  value,	  than	  epistemic	  status.	  This	  new	  
criterion,	   which	   ‘recognizes	   untruth	   as	   a	   condition	   of	   life’,	   is	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   such	   judgments	  
contribute	  to	  a	  	  conception	  of	  the	  world	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  maintain	  an	  acceptable	  quality	  of	  life	  and	  to	  
fulfill	  our	  most	  fundamental	  needs.	  Judgments	  which,	  for	  instance,	  partake	  of	  ‘measuring	  reality	  against	  
the	   purely	   invented	   world	   of	   the	   unconditional	   and	   self-­‐identical’,	   of	   ‘a	   constant	   falsification	   of	   the	  
world	  by	  means	  of	  numbers	   ‘,	   are,	  Nietzsche	   tells	  us,	   false	  but	   indispensable.	  Without	  belief	   in	   them,	  
‘man	  could	  not	  live’	  (BGE:	  4).	  That	  he	  leaves	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘could	  not	  live’	  rather	  vague	  does	  nothing	  to	  
refute	  our	  view	  that	  he	  regards	  such	  judgments	  as	  invaluable	  despite	  their	  negative	  epistemic	  value.	  	  
	  And	   when	   Nietzsche	   declares	   that	   he	   places	   ‘the	   synthetic	   judgments	   a	   priori’	   among	   ‘the	   falsest	  
judgments’,	   the	   reference	   to	   Kant	   is	   unmistakable,	   and,	   for	   our	   purposes,	   of	   the	   utmost	   significance.	  
For,	   among	   Kant’s	   best	   known	   doctrines	   was	   his	   view	   that	   judgments	   admitted	   of	   division	   into	   four	  
categories:	   analytic	   a	  priori,	   analytic	   a	  posteriori,	   synthetic	   a	  priori,	   and	   synthetic	   a	  posteriori	   (Kant	   ).	  
Synthetic	  a	  priori	  judgments	  were,	  for	  Kant,	  judgments	  whose	  truth	  could	  be	  ascertained	  independently	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of	   experience,	   but	   not	   by	  mere	   examination	  of	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	   terms	   they	   contained.	  And	  moral	  
judgments	   were,	   on	   his	   view,	   along	   with	   mathematical	   propositions	   and	   the	   proposition	   that	   every	  
event	   has	   a	   cause,	   such	   judgments.	   Since	   Nietzsche	   regards	   ‘synthetic	   a	   priori	   judgments’	   as	   among	  
judgments	   whose	   poor	   epistemic	   credentials	   are	   counterbalanced	   by	   value	   for	   life	   preservation	   and	  
enhancement,	  and	  clearly	  employs	  the	  label	  with	  the	  same	  extension	  that	  Kant	  gave	  to	  it,	  he	  must	  also	  
see	  moral	  judgments	  as	  false	  but	  indispensable.	  	  	  
So,	   there	   are	   good	   textual	   reasons	   for	   supposing	   that	  Nietzsche	   saw	   certain	   evaluative	   judgments	   as	  
possessing	   value	   that	   did	   not	   stem	   from	   their	   being	   true	  or	   false.	  He	   saw	   them	  as	   crucial	   to	   keeping	  
people	   in	   existence	   (as	   ‘life-­‐‘	   or	   ‘species-­‐preserving’)	   or	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   higher	   individuals	   (as	  
‘species-­‐cultivating’).	  And	  this	  may	  serve	  to	  explain	  why	  he	  came	  to	  regard	  them	  more	  favorably	  in	  The	  
Gay	  Science.	  Attacks	  on	  the	  supposition	  that	  epistemic	  worth	  is	  the	  only,	  and	  indeed,	  the	  highest,	  form	  
of	   value	   judgments	   can	  possess	   are	  also	  present	   in	  other	  works.	  Another	   famous	   instance	  of	   such	  an	  
attack	   occurs	   in	   the	   third	   essay	   of	   the	   Genealogy,	   where	   Nietzsche	   inveighs	   against	   contemporary	  
scholars	  for	  their	  ‘unconditional	  will	  to	  truth’.	  Modern	  scholarship,	  he	  tells	  us,	  is	  but	  the	  latest	  and	  most	  
‘spiritualized’	  manifestation	  of	   the	  ascetic	   ideal,	  a	  product	  of	   the	   latter	  having	  shed	   its	   religious	  roots.	  
No	  one	  can	  deny	  the	  vigour	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  polemic	  against	  the	  ‘faith	  in	  truth’	  here,	  but	  his	  reasons	  for	  
chastising	  contemporary	  scholarship	  and	  scholars	  here	  are	  laid	  down	  with	  limited	  clarity,	  and	  we	  must	  
perform	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  extrapolation	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  precise	  understanding	  of	  them.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  
they	  are	  intimately	  related	  –	  indeed,	  identical	  –	  to	  the	  reasons	  he	  sets	  out	  in	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil	  for	  
not	  dismissing	  judgments	  clearly	  on	  account	  of	  their	  expressing	  falsehoods.	  	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  section	  24	  of	  the	  third	  essay,	  Nietzsche	  refers	  his	  readers	  to	  a	  section	  of	  The	  Gay	  Science	  
(344),	  in	  which	  he	  describes	  ‘the	  truthful	  man’	  –	  the	  man	  who	  sees	  truth	  as	  having	  absolute	  value	  –	  as	  
affirming	   ‘another	   (possibly,	   for	   Nietzsche,	   imaginary)	   world	   other	   than’	   the	   real	   one,	   ‘that	   of	   life,	  
nature,	  and	  history’.	  He	  asks	  rhetorically,	   ‘insofar	  as	  he	  affirms	  this	  “other	  world”,	  does	  this	  not	  mean	  
that	   he	   has	   to	   deny	   its	   antithesis,	   this	   world,	   our	  world?’	   The	   unconditional	   will	   to	   truth	   directs	   our	  
attention	   away	   from	   ‘life’,	   by	  which	  Nietzsche	  presumably	  means	   the	  pursuit	   of	   our	   natural	   interests	  
and	  the	  discharge	  of	  our	  natural	  instincts,	  and	  leads	  us	  into	  a	  ‘general	  renunciation	  of	  all	  interpretation	  
(of	   forcing,	  adjusting,	  abbreviating,	  omitting,	  padding,	   inventing,	   falsifying	  and	  whatever	  else	   is	  of	   the	  
essence	  of	  interpreting)’	  (GM	  III:	  24).	  
And	  ‘interpretation’	  evidently	  involves	  embracing	  falsehood,	  or	  issuing	  false	  judgments.	  Nietzsche	  baldly	  
informs	   us	   that	   he	   equates	   interpreting	   with,	   among	   other	   acts	   of	   the	   intellect,	   ‘inventing’	   and	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‘falsifying’.	   To	   interpret,	   for	  Nietzsche,	   seems	   to	  be	   to	  offer	   a	   certain	   reading	  of	   things	  without	  being	  
primarily	   concerned	  with	   the	   absolute	   truth	   of	   the	   account,	   and	   to	   instead	   be	   driven	   by	   other	   (non-­‐
epistemic)	  goals,	  like	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  ethos	  that	  drives	  a	  people	  or	  a	  civilization.	  And	  there	  can	  
be	   little	  doubt	   that	  what	  Nietzsche	   is	  urging	   in	   these	   sections	   is	   a	   revaluation	  of	   the	  will	   to	   truth,	  or,	  
rather,	  a	  devaluation	  of	  it.	  Scholarly	  inquiry	  that	  resists	  all	  interpreting,	  that	  is	  driven	  solely	  by	  the	  will	  to	  
truth,	  ushers	  in	  and	  maintains	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  physiological	  conditions:	  	  
A	   certain	   impoverishment	   of	   life	   is	   a	   presupposition	   of	   [science]	   –	   the	   affects	   grown	  
cool,	  the	  tempo	  of	  life	  slowed	  down,	  dialectics	  in	  place	  of	  instinct,	  seriousness	  imprinted	  
on	   faces	   and	   gestures	   (seriousness,	   the	   most	   unmistakable	   sign	   of	   a	   labored	  
metabolism,	   of	   struggling,	   laborious	   life).	   Observe	   the	   ages	   in	   the	   history	   of	   people	  
when	   the	   scholar	   steps	   into	   the	   foreground:	   they	   are	   ages	   of	   exhaustion,	   often	   of	  
evening	  and	  decline;	  overflowing	  energy,	  certainty	  of	  life	  and	  of	  the	  future,	  are	  things	  of	  
the	  past.	  (GM	  III:	  25)	  
What	  Nietzsche	  does	  here	  is	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  value	  of	  truth	  and	  present	  as	  valuable	  interpretation	  or	  
‘falsification’.	   The	   physiological	   conditions	   that	   necessarily	   take	   root	   when	   commitment	   to	   truth	   is	  
absolute	  are	  conditions	  that	  signify	  a	   lack	  of	   flourishing,	  an	   ‘impoverishment	  of	   life’.	  His	  attack	  on	  the	  
will	  to	  truth	  shows	  Nietzsche	  to	  be	  someone	  willing	  to	  affirm	  the	  value	  of	  falsehood.	  But	  recognition	  of	  
this	  Nietzschean	  theme	  will	  supply	  the	  error	  theoretic	  interpreter	  with	  resources	  for	  explaining	  The	  Gay	  
Science’s	   changed	   attitude	   toward	   evaluative	   discourse.	  Nietzsche’s	   realization	   that	   a	   false	   judgment,	  
though	  erroneous,	  might	  have	  great	  value	  for	  life,	  could	  suffice	  to	  explain	  why,	  despite	  still	  being	  in	  the	  
grip	   of	   error	   theory,	   he	   came	   to	   view	   evaluative	   discourse	   favourably.	   We	   need	   not	   be	   forced	   to	  
conclude,	  as	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  do,	  that	  his	  metaethical	  commitments	  were	  fundamentally	  altered.	  	  
We	  now	  turn	   to	   the	  second	  consideration	  offered	  by	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick:	   that	   taking	  Nietzsche	   to	  be	  a	  
non-­‐cognitivist	  about	  evaluative	  judgment	  best	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  his	  question	  in	  section	  299.	  It	  
must	  be	  stated	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  the	  brevity	  of	  their	  argument	  makes	  understanding	  and	  evaluating	  it	  
difficult.	  At	  first	  glance,	  it	  seems	  unclear	  why	  non-­‐cognitivism	  should	  be	  better	  suited	  to	  accounting	  for	  
Nietzsche’s	  question	  than	  error	  theory.	  For	  non-­‐cognitivism,	  as	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  acknowledge,	  is	  quite	  
naturally	  regarded	  as	  lending	  itself	  to	  an	  alliance	  with	  antirealism	  about	  value.	  While	  the	  view	  remains	  
consistent	  with	  the	  existence	  of	  values	  (that	  our	  value	  judgments	  are	  mere	  expressions	  of	  emotion	  and	  
other	   non-­‐cognitive	   reactions	   does	   not	   straightforwardly	   imply	   that	   no	   evaluative	   properties	   exist),	   it	  
renders	   these	   properties	   explanatorily	   irrelevant.	   For,	   its	   central	   claim	   that	   evaluative	   judgments	   are	  
16	  
	  
expressions	   of	   non-­‐cognitive	   states	   of	   mind	   rather	   than	   beliefs	   allows	   it	   to	   avoid	   having	   to	   posit	   an	  
objective	  domain	  of	  values	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  making	  of	  such	  judgments.	  And	  its	  compatibility	  with	  
antirealism	  and	   the	   scientific	  worldview,	  on	  which	   values	   are	  not	   among	   the	  ultimate	   constituents	  of	  
reality,	   is	   what	   often	   draws	   people	   to	   it.	  Many	   choose	   to	   endorse	   non-­‐cognitivism	   because	   it	   allows	  
them	   to	   retain	   their	   antirealist	   commitments.	   Indeed,	   it	   might	   be	   argued	   that	   those	   who	   take	   non-­‐
cognitivism	  to	  be	  true	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  also	  endorse	  antirealism	  –	  if	  values	  do	  not	  figure	  in	  any	  way	  
in	  evaluative	  discourse	  and	  practice,	  or	  have	  no	   role	   to	  play	   in	  accounting	   for	  any	  phenomenon,	   then	  
there	  seems	  to	  be	  compelling	  reason	  to	  regard	  them	  as	  chimerical.	  	  
But	  Nietzsche’s	  question	   in	   section	  299	  of	  The	  Gay	  Science	   –	   if	   taken	   literally	  –	  appears	   to	  be	  how	  to	  
make	   things	   acquire	   the	   properties	   of	   beauty,	   attractiveness	   and	   desirability.	   This	   would	   be	   rather	  
challenging	   to	   account	   for	   were	   he	   a	   non-­‐cognitivist,	   given	   the	   very	   naturally	   forged	   association	  
between	   antirealism	   and	   non-­‐cognitivism.	   He	   would,	   like	   someone	   committed	   to	   error	   theory,	   have	  
regarded	  values	  as	  nonexistent	  and	  incapable	  of	  being	  introduced	  into	  the	  world.	  The	  question	  would,	  it	  
appears,	  make	   as	   little	   sense	   in	   the	  mouth	   of	   a	   non-­‐cognitivist	   as	   it	  would	   in	   the	  mouth	   of	   an	   error	  
theorist.	  	  
Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  overcome	  this	  difficulty	  by	  apparently	  having	  Nietzsche	  mean,	  by	  the	  terms	  ‘beauty’,	  
’attractiveness	   and	   ‘desirability’,	   the	   affective	   responses	   of	   people	  who	   encounter	   things	   regarded	   as	  
having	  these	  features;	  for	  Nietzsche,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  can	  make	  things	  be	  beautiful,	  attractive	  or	  
desirable	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  certain	  feelings	  regarding	  various	  objects	  can	  be	  induced	  
in	   people.	  While	   it	  might	   be	   conceded	   that	   this	   reading	   does	   not	   seem	   overly	   strained,	   its	   adoption	  
seems	   underdetermined	   by	   Nietzsche’s	   own	   writings.	   Why	   not,	   it	   might	   be	   asked,	   take	   Nietzsche	  
literally	   and	   suggest	   instead	   that	   he	  was	   asking	   how	  we	   could	  make	   things	   acquire	   the	  properties	   of	  
beauty,	  attractiveness	  and	  desirability?	  Such	  an	  approach	  would	  have	  to	  proceed	  by	  attributing	  to	  him	  
some	   form	  of	   subjective	   realism,	  a	   view	  according	   to	  which	   things	  acquire	   their	   evaluative	  properties	  
only	   through	   our	   acts	   of	   valuing.	   For	   Nietzsche	   does	   not	   hesitate	   to	   express	   opposition	   to	   objective	  
realism,	  the	  view	  that	  things	  possess	  value	  independently	  of	  any	  valuing	  subjects	  (‘Whatever	  has	  value	  
in	  our	  world	  now	  does	  not	  have	  value	  in	  itself,	  according	  to	  its	  nature	  (…)’)	  (GS	  301).	  	  	  
Clark	   and	  Dudrick	   briefly	   consider	   subjective	   realism	  as	   an	   alternative	   to	  making	   sense	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  
question,	   and	  quickly	   conclude	   that,	   because	   the	   view	   is	   rendered	   implausible	  by	   its	   supposition	   that	  
something’s	  being	  good	  or	  bad	  is	  somehow	  dependent	  on	  someone’s	  considering	  it	  so.	  Their	  attempt	  at	  
ruling	   out	   such	   an	   interpretive	   approach,	   however,	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	   begging	   the	   question	   against	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Nietzsche.	  For,	  their	  reason	  for	  dismissing	  the	  suggestion	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  question	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  
section	   299	   is	   the	   putative	   unlikelihood	   that	   something’s	   being	   good	   or	   bad	   depends	   on	   certain	  
subjective	  states.	  They	  do	  not	  bother	  to	  expound	  on	  why	  they	  consider	  this	  unlikely,	  relying	  apparently	  
on	   an	   intuition	  which	   they	   expect	   readers	   to	   share.	  Murder’s	   being	  wrong,	   they	   point	   out,	   does	   not	  
appear	  to	  be	  due	  to	  our	  thinking	  it	  wrong.	  Its	  wrongness	  seems	  rather	  to	  rest	  on	  certain	  objective	  facts,	  
such	  as	  its	  being	  the	  intentional	  killing	  of	  an	  innocent,	  its	  causing	  pain	  and	  suffering,	  etc.	  Although	  many	  
would	  no	  doubt	  agree	  with	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  here,	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  established	  in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  a	  
philosopher	  as	   radical	  as	  Nietzsche	  thought	   likewise.	  Some	  of	  his	   remarks	   in	  section	  301	  seem	  to	  also	  
favour	   a	   subjective	   realist	   reading:	   ‘Whatever	   has	   value	   in	   our	   world	   does	   not	   have	   value	   in	   itself,	  
according	  to	  its	  nature	  –	  nature	  is	  always	  value-­‐less,	  but	  has	  been	  given	  value	  at	  some	  time,	  as	  a	  present	  
–	   and	   it	   was	   we	   who	   gave	   and	   bestowed	   it.	   Only	   we	   have	   created	   the	   world	   that	   concerns	   man!’	  
Nietzsche	  seems	  here	  to	  think	  that	  certain	  properties	  have	  been	  added	  to	  the	  world	  through	  our	  acts	  of	  
valuing;	  a	  new	  part	  has	  been	  added	  to	  the	  world	  –	  the	  part	   ‘that	  concerns	  man’.	  And	  non-­‐cognitivism	  
appears	  unable	  to	  accommodate	  this	  Nietzschean	  supposition.	  	  
Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  also	  seem	  to	  be	  suggesting	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  proposal	  that	  we	  look	  to	  artists	  for	  lessons	  
in	   how	   to	  make	   things	   beautify	   and	   attractive	   indicates	   that	   he	   conceives	   of	   evaluative	   judgments	   in	  
much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  non-­‐cognitivist	  does.	  He	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  artist	  ‘induces	  in	  us	  certain	  reactions	  
to	   things	   by	  manipulating	  our	   perspectives	   on	   them’	   (emphasis	  mine),	   by,	   for	   instance,	   ‘getting	  us	   to	  
look	  at	  things	  from	  a	  distance’	  or	  ‘extracted	  from	  their	  context’,	  and	  then	  recommends	  that	  his	  potential	  
creators	  of	  value	  proceed	  analogously.	  But	  if	  evaluation,	  for	  Nietzsche,	  involves	  altering	  a	  thing’s	  mode	  
of	  presentation	  in	  order	  to	  evoke	  certain	  passions	  in	  people	  ,	  then	  he	  seems	  to	  be	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  
some	   form	   of	   non-­‐cognitivism.	   And	   Clark	   and	   Dudrick	   	   point	   to	   Nietzsche’s	   association	   of	   evaluative	  
practice	  with	  the	  production	  of	  emotion	  and	  passions	  as	  a	  third	  consideration	  favouring	  their	  reading.	  
Error	  theory,	  they	  seem	  to	  think,	   is	   incompatible	  with	  a	  view	  that	  posits	  a	  strong	  connection	  between	  
valuing	  or	  evaluative	  judgment	  and	  the	  excitement	  of	  passions.	  
But	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  Nietzsche’s	  descriptions	  of	  the	  methods	  employed	  by	  artists	  and	  his	  proposal	  that	  
those	  aiming	  to	  create	  values	   learn	  from	  them	  should	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  error	  theory.	  Error	  theory	  does	  
not	   rule	   out	   people	   being	   made	   to	   feel	   certain	   ways	   about,	   or	   have	   certain	   non-­‐cognitive	   reactions	  
toward,	   various	   natural	   objects.	   It	   may	   consistently	   hold	   that	   people	   have	   been	  made	   –	   possibly	   by	  
Nietzsche’s	  creators	  of	  value	  –	  to	  have	  certain	  non-­‐cognitive	  reactions	  to	  things	  but	  erroneously	  believe	  
that	  these	  reactions	  reflect	  objective	  features	  of	  those	  things.	  It	  may	  coherently	  maintain	  that	  creators	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of	  value,	  like	  artists	  or	  moralists,	  strive	  to	  induce	  in	  others	  various	  non-­‐cognitive	  states	  of	  mind	  such	  as	  
‘preferences	  and	  attitudes’,	   so	   long	  as	   it	  also	  holds	   that	  evaluative	   judgments	  express	   judgments	   that	  
are	  invariably	  mistaken.	  	  
All	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  remarks	  about	  artists’	  methods	  and	  their	  relevance	  to	  aspiring	  creators	  of	  value	  tell	  
us	  about	  his	  view	  regarding	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  activities	  of	  those	  who	  create	  values	  ought	  to	  act	  
on	   those	  who	   imbibe	   and	   embody	   them	   is	   this:	   the	   former	   should	   seek	   to	   evoke	   certain	   patterns	   of	  
feeling	  in	  the	  latter.	  They	  do	  not	  tell	  us	  anything	  about	  his	  view	  on	  the	  function	  of	  evaluative	  judgments.	  
He	  could	  be	  a	  cognitivist	  while	  espousing	  the	  normative	  view	  of	  the	  role	  of	  creators	  of	  value.	  He	  might,	  
without	   contradiction,	   hold	   at	   the	   same	   time	   that	   those	   who	   adopt	   the	   valuations	   introduced	   by	  
creators	   of	   value	   inspired	   in	   their	   approach	   by	   artists	   have	   developed	   certain	   non-­‐cognitive	   attitudes	  
and	   that	   evaluative	   judgments	   are	   cognitive,	   projecting	   these	   attitudes	   on	   to	   things	   themselves	   or	  
describing	  the	  latter	  as	  possessing	  properties	  associated	  with	  these	  attitudes.	  
	  It	  might,	  for	  instance,	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  moralist	  could	  produce	  in	  his	  audience	  a	  certain	  shared	  feeling	  
–	  disgust,	  perhaps	  –	  toward	  murder.	  But	   it	  could	  nonetheless	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  they	  believed	  that	  
the	   disgust	   they	   felt	   reflected	   an	   objective	   property	   that	   all	   acts	   of	   murder	   possessed,	   and	   that	  
evaluative	   beliefs	   were	   beliefs	   regarding	   things	   or	   acts	   having	   properties	   of	   this	   sort,	   that	   is,	   of	  
properties	   that	  were	   the	   objective	   correlates	   of	   the	   feelings	   value	   creators	   induced	   in	   people.	   And	   If	  
Nietzsche	   held	   this	   view	   of	   evaluative	   judgment	   while	   believing	   at	   the	   same	   time	   that	   the	   objective	  
properties	  people	  believed	  their	  attitudes	  to	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  did	  not	  really	  exist,	  he	  would	  end	  up	  as	  an	  
error	   theorist.	   Therefore,	   taken	  alone,	  Nietzsche’s	   appeal	   to	  potential	   creators	  of	   value	   to	   learn	   from	  
artists	  cannot	  offer	  much	  support	   for	  the	  Clark-­‐Dudrick	  reading,	   for	   it	   remains	  silent	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  
the	   function	   of	   evaluative	   judgments.	   Nietzsche’s	   suggestion	   that	   value	   creators	   strive	   to	   evoke	   in	  
people	   certain	   non-­‐cognitive	   states	   of	  mind	   in	   connection	  with	   various	   things	   reveals	   little	   about	   his	  
view	  about	  the	  semantics	  of	  such	  judgments,	  and	  remains	  consistent	  with	  his	  being	  a	  cognitivist,	  or	  even	  
an	  error	  theorist,	  about	  them.	  	  
Hence,	  we	  see	  that	  none	  of	  the	  considerations	  offered	  by	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  privilege	  their	  reading.	  Also	  
cutting	  against	  their	  view	  is	  the	  presence,	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  later	  works,	  of	  what	  seem	  like	  clear	  statements	  
of	   error	   theory.	   The	   most	   prominent	   example,	   already	   considered	   above,	   occurs	   in	   a	   section	   of	   the	  
second	  to	  last	  work	  published	  during	  his	  lifetime,	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols.	  Here,	  Nietzsche	  accuses	  morality	  
of	   ‘believing	   in	   realities	   that	   are	   no	   realities’,	   famously	   declaring	   that	   ‘there	   are	   altogether	   no	  moral	  
facts’(TI	  VII:	  1).	  And	  he	  even	  asserts	  in	  a	  section	  of	  The	  Gay	  Science	  (109)	  that	  ‘none	  of	  our	  aesthetic	  and	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moral	  judgments	  apply	  to	  [the	  world]’.	  If,	  as	  Clark	  and	  Dudrick	  suggest,	  Nietzsche	  abandons	  error	  theory	  
for	  non-­‐cognitivism	  from	  The	  Gay	  Science	  onwards,	  then	  we	  should	  not	  expect	  to	  see	  any	  such	  claims	  in	  
both	  that	  work	  and	  the	  works	  that	  come	  after.	  That	  we	  do	  gives	  us	  further	  reason	  to	  reject	  the	  Clark-­‐
Dudrick	  reading.	  We	  thus	  conclude	  that	  error	  theory	  offers	  a	  better	  account	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  metaethical	  
claims	  than	  non-­‐cognitivism.	  	  
Leiter’s	  Objections	  
Some	  resistance	  to	  efforts	  to	  read	  Nietzsche	  as	  an	  error	  theorist	  comes	  from	  Brian	  Leiter,	  who	  suggests	  
that	   some	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  more	  error	   theoretic	   sounding	   remarks,	   such	  as	   those	   in	   the	   ‘”Improvers”	   if	  
Mankind’	   section	   in	   Twilight	   of	   the	   Idols,	   may	   not	   support	   the	   reading	   when	   taken	   in	   their	   proper	  
context.	  Nietzsche	  declares	  there,	  ‘(…)	  there	  are	  altogether	  no	  moral	  facts.	  Moral	  judgments	  agree	  with	  
religious	  ones	   in	  believing	   in	  realities	  which	  are	  no	  realities’,	  and	   I	  have	  read	  these	   lines	  as	  expressing	  
the	   two	   theoretic	   constituents	   of	   error	   theory:	   cognitivism	   about	   moral	   judgments	   and	   antirealism	  
about	  moral	   properties.	   But	   Leiter	   argues	   that	   Nietzsche’s	   claim	   that	   ‘there	   are	   altogether	   no	  moral	  
facts’	  should	  instead	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  a	  triad	  of	  metaphysical	  theses	  which	  undergird	  the	  types	  of	  
morality	  that	  form	  the	  target	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  criticism	  (in	  Leiter’s	  terms,	  morality	  in	  the	  pejorative	  sense,	  
or	  MPS)	  are	  false	  (Leiter	  2002).	  	  
The	  three	  theses	  are	  as	  follows:	  (1)	  Human	  beings	  possess	  a	  will	  capable	  of	  free	  and	  autonomous	  action,	  
(2)	   ‘the	   self	   is	   sufficiently	   transparent	   that	   agents’	   actions	   can	   be	   distinguished	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	  
respective	  motives’,	  and	  (3)	  ‘human	  agents	  are	  sufficiently	  similar	  that	  one	  moral	  code	  is	  appropriate	  for	  
all’.	   That	   the	   facts	   which	   these	   judgments	   state	   are	   the	   ‘moral	   facts’	   Nietzsche	   is	   referring	   to	   in	   his	  
famous	  claim	  that	  ‘there	  are	  altogether	  no	  moral	  facts’	  is,	  Leiter	  (quite	  implicitly)	  suggests,	  evident	  from	  
the	   context	   in	  which	   the	   latter	   occurs.	  And	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   Leiter’s	   reading	  of	   it	   undermines	  our	   error	  
theoretic	  reading,	  since	  the	  latter	  requires	  Nietzsche	  to	  mean	  by	  ‘moral	  facts’	  all	  those	  entities	  we	  dub	  
‘moral	   properties’.	   The	   falsity	   of	   Leiter’s	   three	   theses	   is	   clearly	   compatible	  with	   the	   existence	   of	   the	  
latter,	   and	   a	   Nietzsche	  who	  were	   firmly	   convinced	   of	   the	   former	  might	   nonetheless	   consistently	   not	  
question	  the	  existence	  of	  moral	  properties.	  So,	  Leiter’s	  reading,	  if	  plausible,	  would	  prove	  problematic	  to	  
the	  error	  theoretic	  account.	  	  
What	  does	  Leiter	  mean	  when	  he	  says	  that	  the	  context	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  declaration	  supports	  his	  reading?	  
Or,	  rather,	  what	  is	  the	  context	  he	  is	  referring	  to?	  Since	  he	  neglects	  to	  explain	  just	  what	  this	  context	  is,	  
we	  must	   resort	   to	   intelligent	  and	  charitable	   conjecture.	   In	   the	  preceding	  part	  of	   the	  work,	   (‘The	  Four	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Great	  Errors’),	  Nietzsche	  issues	  us	  a	  reminder	  concerning	  the	  falsity	  of	  claims	  stating	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  
three	   ‘inward	   facts’.	   Among	   them	   is	   the	   claim	   that	   motives	   are	   the	   true	   causes	   of	   our	   actions	   (and	  
perhaps	  the	  related	  claim	  that	  we	  can	  know	  the	  true	  causes	  of	  our	  actions,	  or	  that	  all	  the	  actual	  causes	  
of	  our	  actions	  are	  to	  be	  sought	  in	  consciousness).	  	  
Against	   this	   claim,	   he	  writes,	   ‘The	   so-­‐called	  motive:	   another	   error.	  Merely	   a	   surface	   phenomenon	   of	  
consciousness,	   something	   alongside	   the	   deed	   that	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   cover	   up	   the	   antecedents	   of	   the	  
deeds	   than	   to	   represent	   them’	   (TI	  VI:	   3).	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  motive,	   like	   the	  action	  believed	   to	  have	  
been	  caused	  by	  it,	  is	  not	  causal	  at	  all,	  let	  alone	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  latter,	  and	  is,	  like	  the	  action,	  an	  effect	  of	  
something	   which	   lies	   beyond	   consciousness	   (‘there	   are	   no	   mental	   causes	   at	   all’)	   and	   which,	  
consequently,	  cannot	  be	  known.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  section	  is	  hence	  to	  deny	  that	  any	  of	  the	  purported	  
causes	  of	  acts	  that	  enter	  into	  consciousness	  –	  the	  will,	  motives,	  and	  the	  ego	  –	  are	  really	  causal.	  The	  true	  
causes	  of	  our	  actions,	   for	  Nietzsche,	  are	   to	  be	   found	   in	   the	  unconscious,	   a	   layer	  of	   the	   self	   that	   is	  by	  
definition	   hidden	   from	   view.	   So	   the	   tenor	   of	   the	   section	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   thorough	   denial	   of	   Leiter’s	  
second	   thesis	   –	   the	   claim	   that	   ‘the	   self	   is	   sufficiently	   transparent	   that	   agents’	   actions	   can	   be	  
distinguished	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  respective	  motives’.	  	  	  
And	   later	   in	   the	   same	   part	   of	   the	   work	   (section	   7,	   ‘The	   error	   of	   free	   will’),	   Nietzsche	   presents	   the	  
doctrine	   of	   free	   will	   as	   a	   malicious	   falsehood	   engendered	   by	   theologians	   aiming	   to	   make	   ‘mankind	  
“responsible”	   in	   their	   sense,	   that	   is,	   dependent	   upon	   them’	   (TI	   VI:	   7).	   	   Hence,	   we	   see	   Nietzsche	  
genealogical	   or	   naturalistic	   approach	   at	   work	   –	   he	   attributes	   the	   birth	   of	   the	   thesis	   that	   all	   humans	  
possess	   free	  will	   to	  something	   ‘human,	  all	   too	  human’:	   the	  priest’s	  will	   to	  punish	  and	  to	   impute	  guilt,	  
arguably	  a	  manifestation	  of	  his	  will	   to	  power	  over	  others.	  But	  what	   is	  crucial	  here	   is	   that	  we	  see	   that	  
Nietzsche	  is	  denying	  the	  truth	  of	  doctrine	  of	  free	  will,	  Leiter’s	  first	  thesis.	  No	  argument	  for	   its	  falsity	   is	  
offered	  here	  –	  indeed,	  Nietzsche	  appears	  to	  take	  its	  negative	  epistemic	  worth	  for	  granted	  from	  the	  very	  
beginning,	  and	  to	  be	  concerned	  only	  with	  laying	  bare	  the	  social	  conditions	  surrounding	  its	  emergence.	  
But	   it	   is	  precisely	  the	  availability	  of	  the	   latter	  sort	  of	  explanation	  which	  allows	  us	  to	  dispense	  with	  the	  
need	   to	   give	   credence	   to	   the	  doctrine	  of	   free	  will	   –	   because	   the	   emergence	  of	   the	   judgment	   that	   all	  
humans	  have	  free	  will	  admits	  of	  explanation	  in	  naturalistic	  terms,	  we	  need	  not	  suppose	  it	  true.	  If	  we	  do	  
not	  need	  to	  suppose	  it	  true	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  anything,	  then,	  it	  seems,	  we	  need	  not	  suppose	  it	  true	  at	  
all.	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  sections	  in	  the	  part	  of	  Twilight	  preceding	  Nietzsche’s	  claim	  that	  ‘there	  are	  altogether	  
no	   moral	   facts’	   feature	   denials	   of	   two	  metaphysical	   theses	   Leiter	   finds	   at	   the	   core	   of	   MPS.	   But	   the	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remaining	  thesis	  which	  informs	  MPS,	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  human	  agents	  are	  sufficiently	  similar	  that	  moral	  
judgments	  ought	  to	  apply	  to	  all	  seems	  also	  to	  be	  attacked	  in	  the	  part	  of	  the	  work	  which	  precedes	  ‘The	  
four	  great	  errors’(‘Morality	  as	  anti-­‐nature’).	  The	  attack	  takes	  place	  in	  section	  6	  of	  that	  part,	  and	  though	  
brief	  and	  somewhat	  vague,	  is	  hard	  to	  miss:	  
Let	  us	  finally	  consider	  how	  naïve	  it	  is	  altogether	  to	  say:	  ‘Man	  ought	  to	  be	  such	  and	  such!’	  
Reality	   shows	   us	   an	   enchanting	   wealth	   of	   types,	   the	   abundance	   of	   a	   lavish	   play	   and	  
change	  of	  forms	  –	  and	  some	  wretched	  loafer	  of	  a	  moralist	  comments:	  ‘No!	  Man	  ought	  
to	  be	  different.’	  He	  even	  knows	  what	  man	  should	  be	  like,	  this	  wretched	  bigot	  and	  prig:	  
he	  paints	  himself	  on	  the	  wall	  and	  comments,	  ‘Ecce	  Homo!’	  (TI	  V:	  6)	  
Nietzsche’s	   argumentative	  drift	   is	   clear.	   The	  moralist’s	  demand	   that	   all	   individuals	   seek	   to	  exhibit	   the	  
‘virtues’	  he	  himself	  embodies	  is	  misguided,	  since	  individuals	  differ	  so	  much	  from	  one	  another	  that	  what	  
should	   be	   considered	   a	   virtue	  with	   regards	   to	   a	   given	   individual	   could	   not	   properly	   be	   considered	   as	  
such	   for	   another.	   Given	   the	   distinctiveness	   of	   each	   individual,	   there	   could	   not	   be	   a	   universal	   ethical	  
good.	  That	  this	   is	  Nietzsche’s	  message	   is	  confirmed	  by	  what	  he	  says	   in	  the	   lines	  that	  follow:	   ‘But	  even	  
when	  the	  moralist	  addresses	  himself	  only	  to	  the	  single	  human	  being	  and	  says	  to	  him,	  ‘You	  ought	  to	  be	  
such	   and	   such!’	   he	   does	   not	   cease	   to	  make	   himself	   ridiculous.	   The	   single	   human	   being	   is	   a	   piece	   of	  
fatum	   from	  the	  front	  and	  from	  the	  rear,	  one	   law	  more,	  one	  necessity	  more	  for	  all	   that	   is	  yet	  to	  come	  
and	  to	  be’	  (TI	  V:	  6).	  	  
That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  moralist	  who	  saw	  the	  content	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  virtue	  as	  varying	  between	  individuals	  
due	   to	   their	   having	   different	   ethically	   significant	   characteristics,	   and	   preached	   different	   virtues	   to	  
different	   individuals,	  would	  nonetheless	  be	  guilty	  of	  as	  grave	  a	   folly	  as	   the	  moralist	  who	  promulgated	  
the	   same	   ethical	   doctrines	   to	   all	   –	   albeit	   not	   for	   the	   same	   reason.	   The	   folly	   of	   the	   moralist	   who	  
recognizes	   that	   differences	   between	   individuals	   render	   a	   universal	   ethics	   untenable	   consists	   in	   his	  
failure	  to	  see	  that	  the	  paths	  of	  development	  open	  to	  any	  individual	  is	  circumscribed	  by	  facts	  about	  his	  
nature	  or	  constitution.	  If	  an	  individual	  were	  not	  ‘a	  piece	  of	  fatum	  from	  the	  front	  and	  rear’,	  the	  approach	  
of	   the	   moralist	   who	   focused	   only	   on	   individual	   human	   beings	   would,	   it	   appears,	   be	   quite	  
unobjectionable	  to	  Nietzsche.	  This	  shows	  that	  morality’s	  disregard	  for,	  or	  rather,	  blindness	  to,	  individual	  
(ethically	  significant)	  differences	  is	  –	  along	  with	  the	  supposition	  that	  individuals	  are	  free	  to	  alter	  the	  way	  
they	  are	  –	  one	  of	  the	  errors	  which	  Nietzsche	  wants	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  in	  this	  section.	  Part	  of	  the	  thrust	  
of	  the	  section	  is	  a	  dismissal	  of	  the	  third	  thesis	  that	  Leiter	  attributes	  to	  MPS	  –	  the	  view	  that	  all	  individuals	  
are	  alike	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  ethically	  significant	  features.	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So	   the	   two	   parts	   of	   Twilight	   which	   immediately	   precede	   that	   containing	   the	   Nietzschean	   claim	   that	  
‘there	  are	  altogether	  no	  moral	  facts’	  feature	  rejections	  of	  all	  three	  of	  Leiter’s	  theses.	  And	  it	  appears	  that	  
it	   is	   the	   latter	   which	   are	   taken	   by	   Leiter	   to	   provide	   the	   context	   within	   which	   the	   claim	   must	   be	  
understood.	  Because	  the	  claim	  which	  we	  have	  read	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  metaethical	  antirealism	  comes	  
on	  the	  heels	  of	  such	  rejections,	  it	  would	  be	  natural,	  Leiter	  thinks,	  to	  construe	  it	  as	  a	  terse	  reiteration	  of	  
them	  all.	   Since	   a	   considerable	   amount	  of	   ink	   has	   been	   spilled	  by	  Nietzsche	  on	   refuting,	   or	   rather,	   on	  
denying	   the	   metaphysical	   presuppositions	   of	   MPS,	   Leiter	   believes	   it	   justified	   to	   read	   the	   claim	   as	  
meaning	  that	  the	  latter	  are	  mistaken.	  I	  shall	  now	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  reject	  Leiter’s	  reading.	  	  
One	  feature	  of	  the	  ‘”Improvers”	  of	  Mankind’	  section	  which	  appears	  in	  tension	  with	  Leiter’s	  reading	  is	  its	  
critical	   scope:	   it	   is	   apparently	   also	   aimed	   against	   moralities	   which	   do	   not	   incorporate	   MPS’s	   faulty	  
metaphysical	  tenets.	  So,	  while	  section	  2	  seeks	  to	  lay	  bare	  Christian	  morality’s	  sickening	  of	  mankind	  and	  
is	   thus	  directed	  against	  a	  morality	  built	  upon	  Leiter’s	   three	   theses,	   section	  3	  discusses	  and	  criticizes	  a	  
morality	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  latter	  –	  ‘Indian	  morality,	  sanctioned	  as	  religion	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  law	  of	  
Manu’	   (TI	   VII:	   3).	   In	   the	   last	   section	   of	   this	   part	   of	   the	  work,	   he	   expands	   the	   scope	  of	   his	   critique	   to	  
include	   yet	   other	   moralities:	   those	   introduced	   by	   Plato,	   Confucius,	   and	   ‘the	   Jewish	   and	   Christian	  
teachers’.	  While	  moralities	  attributed	  to	  the	  latter	  might	  be	  regarded	  as	  paradigms	  of	  MPS,	  it	  is	  doubtful	  
that	   Platonic	   and	   Confucian	   moralists	   ever	   adopted	   the	   metaphysical	   assumptions	   Leiter	   takes	   to	  
characterize	  morality	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  critique.	  So,	  Leiter’s	  interpretive	  claim	  that	  Nietzsche	  
means	  by	  ‘moral	  facts’	  the	  purported	  facts	  on	  which	  MPS	  seeks	  to	  ground	  its	  normative	  claims	  cannot	  
be	  right;	  among	  the	  moralities	  which	  Nietzsche	  describes	  as	  ’believing	  in	  realities	  which	  are	  no	  realities’	  
are	   moralities	   which	   show	   no	   commitment	   to	   Leiter’s	   theses.	   Since	   Nietzsche’s	   criticisms	   in	   ‘The	  
“Improvers”	   of	   Mankind’	   section	   appear	   to	   be	   directed	   at	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   moralities,	   and	   not	   just	  
moralities	   which	   share	   Christian	   morality’s	   spurious	   metaphysical	   assumptions,	   it	   seems	   natural	   to	  
regard	  ‘moral	  facts’	  as	  referring	  not	  to	  the	  facts	  the	  latter	  involve,	  but	  to	  the	  totality	  of	  facts	  posited	  by	  
the	  judgments	  which	  form	  the	  content	  of	  all	  moralities.	  	  
We	  have	  thus	  far	  established	  that	  Nietzsche	  holds	  an	  error	  theory	  with	  regard	  to	  moral	   judgment	  and	  
discourse.	  Moral	  judgments,	  he	  thinks,	  are	  cognitive,	  and	  assume	  that	  there	  exist	  certain	  objective	  facts	  
which	  in	  reality	  fail	  to	  obtain.	  And	  this	  belief	  in	  the	  objectivity	  of	  moral	  facts	  is	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  moral	  
discourse,	   one	   without	   which	   any	   given	   discourse	   could	   not	   be	   appropriately	   classified	   as	   moral.	  
Because	  he	  holds	  that	  moral	  facts	  are	  explanatorily	  superfluous	  and	  can	  hence	  be	  eliminated	  from	  our	  
ontology,	  and	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  these	  facts	  is	  inevitably	  posited	  by	  moral	  judgments,	  the	  latter	  turn	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out	  on	  his	  view	  to	  be	  systematically	  false.	  But	  moral	  values	  or	  facts	  doubtless	  form	  a	  mere	  subset	  of	  all	  
values	  or	  evaluative	  facts.	  The	  values	  referred	  to	  in	  discourses	  on,	  for	  instance,	  etiquette	  or	  aesthetics,	  
are,	   it	  seems	  uncontroversial	  to	  suggest,	  not	  moral	  values,	  but	  are	  nonetheless	  values	  of	  some	  kind	  or	  
other.	  	  
Nietzsche	  himself	  makes	   claims	   regarding	   the	  value	  of	  higher	  and	   lower	   types,	   and	   the	  morality	   from	  
whose	  influence	  he	  wishes	  to	  free	  (some	  of)	  us.	  But	  the	  very	  act	  of	  valuing	  (or	  revaluing)	  presupposes	  
commitment	   to	   certain	   values	   –	   Nietzsche	   must,	   when	   making	   his	   very	   distinctive	   and	   challenging	  
normative	   claims,	   be	   relying	   on	   a	   certain	   evaluative	   framework,	   one	   informed	   by	   the	   acceptance	   of	  
certain	  norms	  or	  values.	  And	  Nietzsche	  is	  quick	  to	  state	  that	  the	  values	  he	  relies	  on	  in	  carrying	  out	  his	  
revaluation	  of	  contemporary	  values	  are	  not	  moral	  values.	  At	  one	  point	  in	  his	  writings,	  he	  tells	  us	  that	  he	  
has	  ‘drawn	  back	  the	  curtain	  from	  the	  corruption	  of	  man’,	  but	  that	  the	  corruption	  he	  has	  brought	  to	  light	  
is	  not	  moral	  corruption:	  ‘In	  my	  mouth,	  this	  word	  is	  at	  least	  free	  from	  one	  suspicion:	  that	  it	  might	  involve	  
a	  moral	  accusation	  of	  man.	  It	  is	  meant	  –	  let	  me	  emphasize	  this	  once	  more	  –	  moraline-­‐free’	  (A:	  6).	  So,	  his	  
reasons	   for	   condemning	  modern	  man	   are	   not	  moral;	   the	   values	   he	   employs	   in	   order	   to	   evaluate	   his	  
contemporaries	   and	   to	   find	   them	   unworthy	   are	   not	   moral	   values.	   Instead,	   we	   are	   to	   understand	  
‘corruption’	  in	  the	  Nietzschean	  sense	  as	  ‘decadence’	  –	  as	  an	  organism’s	  loss	  of	  instinct	  concerning	  what	  
would	  be	  advantageous	  for	  it,	  and	  loss	  of	  will	  to	  power.	  To	  be	  in	  decay	  or	  decline	  is	  to	  lose	  the	  ‘instinct	  
for	  growth,	  for	  durability,	  for	  an	  accumulation	  of	  forces,	  for	  power	  (…)’.	  ‘(…)	  Where	  the	  will	  to	  power	  is	  
lacking	  there	  is	  decline.’	  The	  values	  to	  which	  Nietzsche	  is	  committed	  and	  which	  guide	  his	  revaluation	  of	  
values	  are	  values	  which	  hold	  in	  honour	  organic	  growth,	  self-­‐preservation	  and	  desire	  for	  power,	  but	  are	  
in	  no	  way	  moral.	  Like	  us,	  Nietzsche	  acknowledges	  that	  moral	  value	  is	  not	  exhaustive	  of	  all	  value.	  
But	  if	  we	  recognize	  the	  existence	  of	  value	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  distinct	  from	  moral	  value,	  and	  Nietzsche	  
himself	   is	   at	  pains	   to	  make	   the	  distinction,	   the	   following	  question	   suggests	   itself:	   does	  Nietzsche	  also	  
maintain	   an	   error	   theoretic	   stance	   toward	   other	   types	   of	   value?	  He	   claims	   that	   his	   judgments	   about	  
mankind’s	   corruption	   and	   decadence	   are	   not	  moral	   in	   nature.	   If	   they	   had	   been	  moral	   judgments,	   he	  
would,	  given	  his	  error	   theoretic	  commitments	  concerning	  the	   latter,	  have	  regarded	  them	  as	   false.	  But	  
since	  they	  are	  not,	  what	   is	  his	  metaethical	  position	  with	  respect	   to	  them?	   Is	   it	  also	  error	   theoretic,	  or	  
does	  he	  perhaps	  combine	  a	  similar	  antirealist	  stance	  with	  the	  semantic	  view	  that	  moral	  judgments	  are	  
not	   attempted	   statements	   of	   fact	   but	   expressions	   of	   non-­‐cognitive	   states	   of	   mind	   like	   approval	   or	  
disapproval,	  or	  commitment	  to	  various	  norms?	  Or	  is	  he	  both	  a	  cognitivist	  and	  realist	  where	  other	  forms	  
of	   value	   judgment	   and	   value	   are	   concerned?	   That	   is,	   does	   he	   see	   nonmoral	   evaluative	   judgments	   as	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seeking	  to	  state	  facts	  and	  at	   least	  at	  times	  succeeding	  at	  doing	  so?	  Perhaps	  he	  was	  a	  realist	   in	  a	  more	  
modest	  sense	  –	  someone	  who	  saw	  his	  own	  nonmoral	  valuations	  as	   justified	   insofar	  as	  they	  possessed	  
broad	  appeal,	   rather	   than	  by	  being	   true.	   In	  what	   follows,	  we	   strive	   to	  ascertain	   the	  precise	  nature	  of	  
Nietzsche’s	   nonmoral	   metaethics.	   A	   number	   of	   accounts	   of	   the	   latter	   have	   been	   offered	   by	  




The	  Realist	  Approach	  
We	  now	  turn	  to	  attempts	  to	  attribute	  to	  Nietzsche	  some	  form	  of	  metaethical	  realism.	  According	  to	  Brian	  
Leiter,	  the	  relevant	  form	  of	  realism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  there	  exist	  ‘objective	  facts	  about	  value’,	  that	  is,	  facts	  
whose	   content	   is	   independent	   of	   any	   states	   of	  mind	   (Leiter	   2002).	   If	   realism	  were	   true,	   and	   it	   were	  
furthermore	   true	   that	   murder	   was	   wrong,	   then	   that	   fact	   would	   obtain	   regardless	   of	   what	   anyone	  
believed,	   thought,	   or	   felt.	   Leiter	   dubs	   the	   relevant	   sort	   of	   independence	   ‘epistemic	   independence’	   in	  
order	   to	   emphasize	   that	   what	   is	   imputed	   to	   facts	   about	   value	   by	   the	   realist	   is	   independence	   from	  
subjective	  states.	  Realist	  interpreters	  of	  Nietzsche	  would	  thus	  seek	  to	  show	  that	  the	  latter	  intended	  his	  
evaluative	   claims	   (for	   instance,	   his	   claims	   regarding	  morality’s	   undesirability)	   to	  be	   grounded	  by	   facts	  
that	   are	   objective	   in	   the	   sense	   elaborated	   above.	   To	   which	   facts	   does	   Nietzsche	   accord	   the	   role	   of	  
shoring	   up	   his	   ethical	   claims?	   We	   will,	   in	   our	   discussion	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   plausibly	   construing	  
Nietzsche	  as	  a	  realist,	  proceed	  by	  way	  of	  considering	  Leiter’s	  criticisms	  of	  the	  interpretive	  position.	  	  
Schacht’s	  Realist	  Reading	  	  
Leiter’s	   attack	   on	   the	   realist	   interpretation	   turns	   out	   for	   the	   most	   part	   to	   be	   an	   attack	   on	   a	   realist	  
reading	  advanced	  by	  a	  particular	  commentator,	  Richard	  Schacht,	  no	  doubt	  because	  the	  reading	  strikes	  
him	  as	   the	   leading	  contender	  among	  available	  accounts.	  According	   to	  Leiter,	   the	  objective	   fact	  which,	  
for	   Nietzsche,	   serves	   to	   ground	   his	   evaluative	   claims	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   ‘life	   itself	   is	  will	   to	   power’,	   that	  
human	  beings,	   like	  all	  other	   living	  beings,	  desire	  (in	  whatever	  sense	  appropriate)	  and	  strive	  for	  power.	  
Schacht	   sees	   Nietzsche	   as	   believing	   that	   human	   life,	   like	   all	   other	   life,	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	   single,	  
fundamental	  drive	  –	  will	  to	  power.	  And	  this	  supplies	  a	  privileged	  criterion	  of	  value	  by	  which	  things	  can	  
be	  evaluated:	  
Human	  life,	  for	  Nietzsche,	   is	  ultimately	  a	  part	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  vast	  game…	  [which]	   is	   ,	  so	  to	  speak,	  
the	   only	   game	   in	   town…	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   game	   ,	   he	   holds,	   establishes	   a	   standard	   for	   the	  
evaluation	   of	   everything	   falling	   within	   its	   compass.	   The	   availability	   of	   this	   standard	   places	  
evaluation	  on	  footing	  that	   is	  as	  firm	  as	  that	  on	  which	  the	  comprehension	  of	   life	  and	  the	  world	  
stands.	  (Schacht	  1983)	  	  
More	   simply	   put	   all	   over	   again:	   all	   life,	   human	   life	   included,	   is	   guided	   or	   motivated	   by,	   or	   is	   an	  
expression	  of,	  will	   to	  power.	  The	   latter	   is	   the	  only	   force	  behind	   life.	  And	  this	   fact,	  Schacht’s	  Nietzsche	  
holds,	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  criterion	  of	  value	  –	  something,	  whether	  a	  human	  individual,	  historical	  human	  
society,	  or	  act,	  is	  of	  value	  if	  it	  shows	  or	  expresses	  sufficient	  involvement	  in	  the	  ‘game’,	  and	  lacks	  value	  if	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it	   demonstrates	   resistance	   to	  playing	   it.	   In	  other	  words,	  where	  will	   to	  power	   is	  present,	   value	   can	  be	  
correctly	  assigned,	  and	  where	  it	  is	  absent,	  value	  must	  be	  regarded	  as	  lacking.	  The	  use	  of	  this	  standard	  is	  
meant	   to	   generate	   evaluative	   claims	   as	   firmly	   and	   objectively	   grounded	   as	   non-­‐evaluative	   claims	   –	  
made,	  for	  instance,	  by	  the	  physical	  sciences	  –	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  world.	  Let	  it	  be	  noted	  here	  that	  
though	  Leiter	  chooses	  only	  to	  address	  Schacht’s	   reading	  of	  Nietzschean	  metaethics	  here,	  a	  number	  of	  
other	  commentators	  have	  also	  offered	  interpretations	  on	  which	  the	  will	  to	  power	  is	  taken	  to	  provide	  an	  
objective	   criterion	   for	   evaluation.	   Kaufmann,	   for	   instance,	   concludes,	   after	   considering	   whether,	   for	  
Nietzsche,	  ‘rationality’	  was	  a	  source	  of	  value	  and	  whether	  different	  modes	  of	  power	  were	  to	  be	  valued	  
differently,	  that	  on	  the	  latter’s	  view,	  ‘the	  quantitative	  degree	  of	  power	  is	  the	  measure	  of	  value’3.	  Since	  
Schacht	  remains	  the	  strongest	  proponent	  of	  the	  view	  that	  power	  was	  for	  Nietzsche	  the	  only	  source	  of	  
value,	   we	   shall	   follow	   Leiter	   in	   treating	   him	   as	   the	   chief	   representative	   of	   the	   reading	   and	   examine	  
Leiter’s	  rejoinders	  to	  it.	  	  
Leiter’s	   response	   is	   multi-­‐pronged	   and	   apparently	   convincing.	   He	   first	   brings	   to	   bear	   on	   Schacht’s	  
reading	   the	   long	   acknowledged	   difficulty	   of	   deriving	   an	   evaluative	   claim	   from	   purely	   descriptive	  
premises.	  Schacht’s	  Nietzsche	  seems	  foiled	  by	  the	  unbridgeable	  logical	  chasm	  between	  descriptive	  and	  
normative	  statements.	  Nothing	  appears	  to	  follow	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  life	  is	  will	  to	  power	  regarding	  the	  
value	  of	  the	  latter.	  The	  fact	  that	  every	  living	  thing	  desires	  and	  seeks	  power	  alone	  in	  no	  way	  establishes	  
that	  desiring	  and	  seeking	  power	   is	  good	  and	  that	  not	  so	  desiring	  and	  acting	   is	  bad.	  Because	  Nietzsche	  
uses	   purely	   descriptive	   premises	   to	   generate	   the	   evaluative	   standard	   he	   employs	   in	   grounding	   his	  
ethical	  claims,	  the	  whole	  enterprise	  fails,	  and	  this	  version	  of	  realism	  is	  untenable.	  
Convincing	  as	  this	  may	  seem,	  it	  must	  be	  recognized	  that	  to	  argue	  successfully	  that	  the	  form	  of	  realism	  
attributed	  by	  Schacht	   to	  Nietzsche	   is	   fundamentally	  problematic	   is	  not	   to	  also	  argue	   successfully	   that	  
Nietzsche	   did	   not	   hold	   the	   view.	   That	   the	   view	   is	   bad	   one	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   Nietzsche	   was	   not	  
committed	  to	  it.	  Fortunately,	  Leiter	  proceeds	  to	  offer	  reasons	  for	  supposing	  that	  the	  view	  which	  Schacht	  
presents	  was	  not	  held	  by	  Nietzsche	  himself.	  First,	  he	  attempts	  to	  show	  that	  there	  is	  textual	  evidence	  to	  
suggest	  that	  Nietzsche	  did	  not	  hold	  the	  strong	  form	  of	  the	  thesis	  of	  will	  to	  power	  which	  forms	  the	  basis	  
of	  Schacht’s	  reading.	  In	  his	  works,	  he	  more	  than	  once	  declares	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  will	  to	  power	  is	  a	  sign	  
of	  decline.	  He	  even	  remarks	   in	  one	  place	  that	   ‘all	   the	  supreme	  values	  of	  mankind	   lack	  this	  will’.	  But	   if	  
Nietzsche	   thought	   that	  will	   to	   power	   could	   be	   lacking,	   and	  was	   in	   fact	   lacking	   (at	   least	   among	   those	  
committed	   to	   modern	   values),	   then	   he	   could	   not	   have	   held	   that	   human	   life	   is	   essentially	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Kaufmann,	  Walter	  (1974),	  Nietzsche:	  Philosopher,	  Psychologist,	  Antichrist,	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  p	  200	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manifestation	  of	  that	  will.	  If	  the	  will	  to	  power	  were	  indeed	  the	  essence	  of	  life,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  a	  feature	  
that	   no	   individual	   could	   lack,	   and	   Nietzsche	   would	   have	   been	   guilty	   of	   incoherence.	   Fortunately,	   his	  
writings	   express	   a	   clear	   commitment	   to	   the	   view	   that	   the	   will	   to	   power	   could	   be	   lacking	   in	   some	  
individuals	  and	  under	  threat	  from	  the	  acceptance	  of	  certain	  evaluative	  schema.	  Since	  Nietzsche	  himself	  
seems	  to	  straightforwardly	  countenance	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power’s	  being	  absent,	  we	  ought	  to	  
reject	   Schacht’s	   account,	   which	   represents	   him	   as	   having	   (implicitly,	   at	   least)	   thought	   such	   absence	  
impossible.	  	  
There	   is	  a	   further	   though	  related	  criticism	  of	  Schacht’s	   reading	  which	  Leiter	  does	  not	   issue,	  but	  which	  
appears	  worth	  devoting	  some	  attention	  to	  here.	  Even	  if	  there	  were	  some	  logically	  sound	  way	  of	  making	  
the	  inference	  from	  Nietzsche’s	  descriptive	  premises	  regarding	  the	  omnipresence	  of	  will	  to	  power	  to	  the	  
normative	  conclusion	  that	  power,	  or	  the	  desire	  for	  it,	  is	  the	  sole	  criterion	  of	  value,	  we	  still	  would	  not	  be	  
left	  with	  the	  distinctive	  evaluative	  claims	  attributed	  to	  Nietzsche.	  For	   if	   the	  will	   to	  power	  animated	  all	  
life,	  then	  no	  individual	  could	  fail	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  it,	  no	  act	  could	  fail	  to	  have	  been	  motivated	  by	  it,	  and	  no	  
cultural	  phenomenon	  could	  fail	  to	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  it	  –	  the	  conclusion	  drawn	  above.	  But	  this	  would	  
leave	   Nietzsche	   with	   no	   reason	   for	   denouncing	   the	   things	   he	   whose	   negative	   value	   he	   seeks	   to	  
demonstrate.	  He	  would	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  declaim	  against,	  for	  instance,	  contemporary	  morality	  or	  the	  
Church,	  since,	  as	  products	  of	  human	  activity,	  these	  would	  have	  to	  be	  expressions	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power.	  
The	   fact	   that	   Nietzsche	   is	   relentless	   in	   his	   condemnation	   of	   them	   and	   fervently	   committed	   to	   their	  
devalorization	  shows	  that	  he	  cannot	  –	  at	  least,	  if	  he	  regarded	  will	  to	  power	  as	  the	  lone	  criterion	  of	  value	  
–	  have	  believed,	  as	  Schacht	  supposes,	  that	  will	  to	  power	  lies	  behind	  all	  organic	  activity.	  	  
So	   the	   particular	   interpretation	   which	   Schacht	   offers	   appears	   to	   be	   on	   shaky	   ground.	   But	   successful	  
dismissal	   of	   Schacht’s	   reading	   cannot	   be	   taken	   to	   suffice	   for	   a	   successful	   rejection	   of	   the	   realist	  
approach	  to	  making	  sense	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  metaethics.	  For	  instance,	  rather	  than	  regard	  evaluative	  claims	  
as	  objectively	  grounded	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  generated	  by	  an	  evaluative	  standard	  that	  is	  in	  turn	  derived	  
from	   objective,	   non-­‐evaluative	   facts	   like	   that	   stated	   by	   the	   strong	   will	   to	   power	   thesis,	   the	   realist	  
interpreter	  might	  instead	  suggest	  attributing	  to	  Nietzsche	  a	  picture	  on	  which	  something’s	  being	  valuable	  
is	  itself	  an	  objective	  fact.	  On	  Schacht’s	  account,	  the	  standard	  on	  which	  Nietzsche	  purportedly	  bases	  his	  
evaluative	  claims,	  one	  expressed	  by	  the	  statement,	  ‘power,	  or	  will	  to	  power,	  alone	  is	  of	  value’,	  is	  derived	  
from	  the	  purely	  descriptive	  premise	  that	  all	   life	   is	   the	  will	   to	  power.	  What	  grounds	  the	  standard	   is	  an	  
objective,	  non-­‐evaluative	  fact	  quite	  independent	  of	  it.	  But	  what	  if	  the	  realist	  proposed	  that	  we	  could	  do	  
without	  the	  inference	  Schacht	  ascribes	  to	  Nietzsche	  altogether	  –	  or	  replace	  it	  with	  another	  –	  and	  begin	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with	  a	  fact	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  evaluative,	  or	  begin	  the	  inferential	  chain	  with	  a	  premise	  that	  reported	  
an	  evaluative	  fact?	  This	  would	  enable	  his	   interpretive	  position	  to	  circumvent	  the	  difficulties	  presented	  
by	   the	   logical	   gap	   between	   is-­‐	   and	   ought-­‐statements;	   there	   is,	   in	   principle,	   no	   obstacle	   to	   an	   ought-­‐
claim’s	   being	   entailed	   by	   other	   ought-­‐claims.	   The	   only	   difficulties	   confronting	   the	   drawing	   of	   an	  
evaluative	  conclusion	  from	  evaluative	  premises	  would	  be	  problems	  of	  relevance.	  	  
What	  fact,	  we	  must	  ask,	  would	  the	  realist	  interpreter	  cast	  in	  the	  role	  of	  first	  premise?	  The	  answer	  ought	  
to	  be	  clear:	  the	  fact	  that	  power,	  or	  will	  to	  power,	  is	  of	  value.	  So,	  someone	  wishing	  to	  advance	  a	  realist	  
reading	  of	  Nietzshe	  may	  claim	  that	   it	   is	  a	   fact	  about	   the	  world	   that	  will	   to	  power	   is	  of	  value,	  and	  this	  
gives	  us	  reason	  to	  assign	  greater	  weight	  to	  those	  in	  whom	  this	  will	  appears	  strongest,	  or	  to	  favour	  the	  
realization	   of	   conditions	   under	   which	   it	   would	   enjoy	   the	   greatest	   freedom	   and	   fullest	   expression.	  
Justification	  of	  his	  evaluative	  position	  does	  not	  begin	  with	  a	  purely	  descriptive	  premise	  about	  the	  living	  
world	  being	  essentially	  will	  to	  power,	  but	  with	  the	  evaluative	  premise	  about	  the	  value	  of	  such	  a	  will.	  The	  
difficulty	  of	  explaining	   just	  how	  he	  is	  able	  to	  draw	  his	  evaluative	  conclusions	  from	  a	  purely	  descriptive	  
claim	  never	  arises,	  and	  realism	  is	  able	  to	  avoid	  one	  of	  the	  problems	  Leiter	  attributes	  to	  it.	  	  
Another	  problem	  pointed	  out	  by	   Leiter	   also	   seems	   to	  have	  been	  overcome	  by	   this	   approach.	  Various	  
commentators	   (including	  Leiter)	  have	   long	  noted	  the	   implausibility	  of	   the	  strong	  version	  of	   the	  will	   to	  
power	  thesis.	  They	  further	  suggest	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  lack	  of	  commitment	  to	  it	  is	  attested	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  few	  statements	  of	  it	  in	  his	  works	  show	  up	  almost	  exclusively	  in	  the	  Nachlass,	  a	  work	  whose	  contents	  
he	  never	  himself	  decided	   to	  have	  published,	   and	  whose	  authority	   as	   a	   source	  of	   claims	  he	  ultimately	  
endorsed	  is	  hence	  questionable.	  Only	  in	  the	  Nachlass	  is	  the	  supposed	  prevalence	  of	  will	  to	  power	  taken	  
to	  imply	  a	  criterion	  of	  value:	   ‘Assuming	  that	   life	   itself	   is	  the	  will	  to	  power,	  then	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  life	  
that	  has	  value,	  except	  the	  degree	  of	  power’	  (WP:	  55).	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  ignore	  the	  force	  of	  the	  suggestion	  that	  
a	  philosopher	  as	  driven	  by	  naturalistic	   commitments	  as	  Nietzsche	  would	   find	  a	  doctrine	  so	  difficult	   to	  
establish	  empirically	  quite	  unpalatable,	  and	  to	  deny	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  for	  maintaining	  one’s	  
reservations	  regarding	  the	  relevant	  Nachlass	  claims.	  	  
But	  adopting	  the	  approach	  of	  grounding	  Nietzsche’s	  evaluative	  position	  on	  an	  evaluative	  premise	  such	  
as	   that	   suggested	   above	   offers	   the	   advantage	   of	   enabling	   one	   to	   avoid	   having	   to	   endorse	   a	   dubious	  
metaphysical	  view	  like	  the	  strong	  will	  to	  power	  thesis,	  since	  one	  now	  need	  not	  hold	  that	  all	  life	  –or	  even	  
all	   force,	   animate	   or	   inanimate	   –	   is	   at	   bottom	  will	   to	   power,	   but	   only	   that	  will	   to	   power	   is	   of	   value.	  
Because	  Schacht’s	   reading	  of	  Nietzsche	   rested	  on	   treating	   the	   latter	  as	   reasoning	   from	   the	  claim	   that	  
human	  life	  is	  part	  of	  ‘a	  vast	  game’,	  ‘the	  only	  game	  in	  town’,	  will	  to	  power,	  it	  is	  committed	  to	  accepting	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the	  strong	  will	   to	  power	  thesis.	  But	  the	  view	  that	  Nietzsche	  begins,	   in	  deriving	  his	  evaluative	  position,	  
from	   the	   belief	   that	   will	   to	   power	   is	   good,	   need	   not	   be	   similarly	   bound.	   It	   hence	   avoids	   another	   of	  
Leiter’s	  criticisms,	  and	  we	  must	  finally	  conclude	  that	  objective	  realism	  as	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  
metaethical	  claims	  survives	  Leiter’s	  attack.	  	  
	  
Foot’s	  more	  modest	  realist	  interpretation	  
Leiter	   also,	   in	   his	   book,	   examines	   and	   rejects	   a	   second,	   more	   modest	   realist	   interpretation	   of	  
Nietzschean	   metaethics,	   one	   which	   he	   claims	   originates	   in	   Philippa	   Foot’s	   work	   on	   Nietzsche4.	   The	  
realism	  which	  Foot	  attributes	  to	  Nietzsche	  regards	  the	  objectivity	  of	  evaluative	  claims	  as	  resting	  not	  on	  
certain	  facts	  about	  the	  world,	  but	  on	  intersubjective	  agreement	  or	  justification;	  Nietzsche,	  as	  a	  realist	  of	  
this	   sort,	  would	  hold	  his	  own	  evaluative	  position	   to	  be	   justified	  by	   its	   intersubjective	  appeal,	  or	  by	   its	  
ability	   to	   command	   the	   allegiance	   of	   various	   individuals.	   In	   a	   passage	   which	   Leiter	   quotes,	   Foot	  
represents	  Nietzsche	  as	  drawing	  upon	  a	  ‘common	  attitude’	  of	  interest	  and	  admiration	  which	  she	  takes	  
us	  to	  nurse	  toward	  ‘remarkable	  men	  of	  exceptional	  independence	  of	  mind	  and	  strength	  of	  will’	  in	  order	  
to	  justify	  his	  own	  evaluative	  views	  (Foot	  1973).	  Foot	  sees	  Nietzsche	  as	  correctly	  observing	  that	  many	  of	  
us	   nurse	   the	   same	   kind	  of	   sentiment	   toward	   the	   types	  of	   person	  he	  deems	   great	   that	  we	  do	   toward	  
objects	   acknowledged	   to	   possess	   great	   aesthetic	   value,	   that	   there	   exists	   widespread	   aesthetic	  
appreciation	   of	   Nietzsche’s	   higher	   types.	   	   	   It	   is	   in	   virtue	   of	   this	   purportedly	   common	   and	   favourable	  
attitude	  that	  Nietzsche	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  doing	  more	  than	  merely	  ‘presenting	  us	  with	  a	  clash	  of	  interests	  
–	   the	   good	   of	   the	   strong	   against	   that	   of	   the	  weak.’	   The	   existence	   of	   such	   a	   convergence	   of	   attitude	  
enables	  Nietzsche	  to	  claim	  for	  his	  evaluative	  propositions	  a	  privileged	  status,	  or	  a	  normative	  weight	  that	  
surpasses	  that	  of	  rival	  propositions.	  	  
At	  first	  glance,	  the	  difference	  between	  this	  type	  of	  ‘realist’	  position	  and	  an	  antirealist	  position,	  on	  which	  
all	   that	   is	   presented	   is	   a	  mere	   ‘clash	   of	   interests	   –	   the	   good	   of	   the	   strong	   against	   that	   of	   the	  weak’,	  
seems	  unclear.	  ‘Objectivity’	  is,	  after	  all,	  secured	  by	  nothing	  more	  than	  agreement,	  or	  common	  appeal.	  If	  
such	  a	  notion	  of	  objectivity	  were	  adopted,	  then	  the	  antirealist	  who	  saw	  people	  as	  admitting	  of	  division	  
into	  those	  attracted	  to	  a	  certain	  evaluative	  view	  and	  those	  who	  found	  it	  unattractive	  might	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   Foot,	   Philippa	   (1973),	   “Nietzsche:	   The	   Revaluation	   of	   Values”,	   in	   Robert	   C.	   Solomon	   (ed.),	  Nietzsche:	   A	   Collection	   of	  




‘realist’,	   since	   the	   appeal	   of	   the	   view	   would	   still	   be	   common	   –	   common	   among	   those	   who	   found	  
themselves	   drawn	   to	   it.	   A	  way	  must	   hence	   be	   found	   to	   distinguish	   this	  weaker	   form	  of	   realism	   from	  
antirealist	  views	  which	  recognize	  intersubjective	  commitment	  to	  various	  evaluative	  positions.	  	  
It	  might	   seem	   that	   the	   key	   to	   doing	   so	   lies	   in	   gaining	   a	  more	  precise	   understanding	   of	   the	   particular	  
sense	  that	  the	  word	  ‘common’	  assumes	  within	  Foot’s	  view,	  or	  in	  according	  it	  a	  specific	  meaning.	  In	  order	  
that	  her	  Nietzsche	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  presenting	  a	  mere	  clash	  of	   interests,	   ‘common’	  must,	  for	  Foot,	  be	  
taken	  to	  mean	  ‘broad’	  or	  ‘widely	  held’.	  His	  evaluative	  claims	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  objectively	  justified,	  or	  
admit	   of	   realist	   justification,	   unless	   they	   are	   observed	   to	   have	  widespread	   appeal.	   So,	   in	   order	   for	  
Nietzsche’s	  evaluative	  views	  to	  enjoy	  any	  sort	  of	  privilege,	  they	  must	  appeal	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  us.	  	  
Leiter	  draws	  on	  what	  he	  regards	  as	  Nietzsche’s	  Callicleanism	  in	  order	  to	  refute	  Foot’s	  reading.	  Nietzsche,	  
he	   argues,	   shares	   the	   Calliclean	   view	   that	  morality	  was	   originally	   conceived	   and	   disseminated	   by	   the	  
weak	   to	  hinder	   the	   flourishing	  of	   the	  strong.	  Nietzsche,	  according	   to	  Leiter,	  views	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  
strong	   and	  weak	   as	   fundamentally	   incompatible	   –	   the	   strong	   can	   flourish	   only	   if	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  
weak	  are	  foregone,	  and	  the	  weak	  can	  thrive	  only	  if	  the	  strong	  are	  firmly	  prevented	  from	  realizing	  their	  
potential	   for	  greatness.	  Among	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  preservation	  of	  each	  type	  of	   individual	  are	   is	  the	  
sacrifice	  of	  the	   interests	  of	  the	  other.	  Leiter	  concludes	  for	  this	  reason,	  and	  because	  Nietzsche	  saw	  the	  
weak	  as	  forming	  an	  overwhelming	  majority,	  that	  his	  evaluative	  position	  –	  one	  according	  to	  which	  value	  
resides	  only	  in	  the	  strong,	  their	  activity,	  and	  the	  conditions	  essential	  to	  their	  survival	  –	  would	  not	  appeal	  
to	  most	  people.	  
But	  Leiter’s	  response	  surely	  runs	  together	  two	  possible	  senses	  of	  the	  expression	  ‘appeal	  to’.	  Nietzsche’s	  
claims	  about	  the	  value	  of	  stronger	  types	  and	  the	  conditions	  vital	  to	  their	  preservation	  might	  well	  appeal	  
to	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  –	  including	  the	  weak	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ascribing	  value	  to	  types	  of	  individual	  and	  
character	   traits	   that	   are	   widely	   admired	   or	   revered,	   without	   appealing	   to	   them	   in	   a	   different	   way:	  
moving	   them	   to	   act	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   encourage	   the	   emergence	   of	   these	   individuals	   and	   traits.	  
Experiencing	   the	   appeal	   of	   something	   in	   the	   first	   sense	  would	   amount	   to	  merely	   esteeming	   it	   highly,	  
whereas	  experiencing	  its	  appeal	  in	  the	  second	  sense	  would	  amount	  to	  being	  motivated	  by	  it,	  or	  allowing	  
one’s	   actions	   to	   be	   guided	   by	   it.	   And	   the	   weak	   could	   certainly	   experience	   the	   appeal	   of	   Nietzsche	  
evaluative	  claims	  –	  or	  of	  the	  objects	  to	  which	  they	  impute	  value	  –	  in	  the	  former	  manner	  without	  at	  the	  
same	   time	   succumbing	   to	   their	   normative	   force.	   Nietzsche’s	   Callicleanism	   would	   certainly	   be	  
inconsistent	  with	  the	  view	  that	  the	  weak	  would	  act	  in	  ways	  conducive	  to	  –	  indeed,	  sacrifice	  themselves	  
for	  –	  the	  production	  of	  higher	  types.	  But	  it	  would	  be	  quite	  compatible	  with	  the	  view	  that	  even	  the	  weak	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would	   recognize	   the	  strong	  as	  admirable.	  So,	  Leiter’s	  attempt	  at	   resisting	  Foot’s	   reading	   fails.	   In	  what	  
follows,	  I	  show	  that	  Foot’s	  reading	  –	  that	  Nietzsche	  sees	  his	  own	  evaluative	  claims	  as	  privileged	  in	  virtue	  
of	  commanding	  broad	  interpersonal	  appeal	  –	  is	  supported	  by	  certain	  features	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  writing.	  	  
Foot’s	   suggestion	   that	   Nietzsche	   is	   a	   realist,	   and	   that	   his	   realism	   amounts	   to	   viewing	   his	   own	   value	  
judgments	  as	  having	  broad	  appeal,	  appears	  plausible	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  the	  considerations	  he	  offers	  for	  
favouring	   these	   judgments	   often	   involve	   facts	   about	   the	   health	   or	   psycho-­‐physiological	   well-­‐being	   of	  
individuals	   in	   the	   grip	  of	   the	   evaluative	  perspectives	  he	   impugns,	   facts	   of	   a	   sort	  which	  we	   commonly	  
regard	   as	   undesirable,	   and	   as	   providing	   us	   with	   reasons	   for	   taking	   remedial	   action.	   More	   generally,	  
Nietzsche	  can	  often	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  offering	  reasons	  for	  making	  his	  distinctive	  evaluative	  claims	  –	  reasons	  
which	  command	  wide-­‐ranging	  assent.	  	  
The	  second	  section	  of	  the	  part	  of	  his	  late	  work	  ‘The	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols’,	  for	  instance,	  offers	  reasons	  for	  
why	   Christian	   morality	   is	   undesirable	   by	   illuminating	   its	   harmful	   effects	   on	   individuals	   in	   whom	   the	  
animal	   instincts	  were	  once	  strong.	   It	  expresses	  Nietzsche’s	  evaluative	  stance	  on	  Christian	  morality	  and	  
seeks	  to	  provide	  rational	  support	  for	  it.	  And	  in	  doing	  the	  latter,	  Nietzsche	  appeals	  to	  historical	  examples,	  
pointing	   to	   certain	   psychological	   and	   physical	   facts	   about	   ‘barbarians’	   who	   came	   under	   Christianity’s	  
sway	   in	  the	  Middle	  Ages.	  Despite	  the	  Church’s	  claim	  to	  have	   improved	  them,	  Nietzsche	  tells	  us,	   these	  
individuals	  were	   instead	  made	  ‘sick’.	  The	  noble	  Teutons,	  after	  being	   lured	   into	  monastery	  and	  morally	  
‘improved’,	  he	  writes,	  became	  
like	  a	  caricature	  of	  man,	  like	  a	  miscarriage:	  he	  had	  become	  a	  ‘sinner’,	  he	  was	  stuck	  in	  a	  
cage,	  imprisoned	  among	  all	  sorts	  of	  terrible	  concepts.	  And	  there	  he	  lay,	  sick,	  miserable,	  
malevolent	   against	   himself:	   full	   of	   hatred	   against	   the	   springs	   of	   life,	   full	   of	   suspicion	  
against	  all	  that	  was	  still	  strong	  and	  happy.	  	  In	  short,	  a	  ‘Christian’.	  	  (TI	  VII:	  2)	  
The	  good	  man	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  Christian	  morality	  is,	  according	  to	  Nietzsche,	  the	  ‘sick’	  man,	  the	  man	  who,	  
instead	  of	  viewing	  his	  dispositions,	  desires	  and	  passions	  as	  self-­‐justifying	  and	  attractive,	  regards	  them	  as	  
deserving	   of	   censure,	   as	   evil.	   He	   is	   also	   deeply	   unhappy,	   for	   he	   is	   unable	   to	   rid	   himself	   of	   his	   most	  
essential	  psychological	  traits	  despite	  his	  opposition	  to	  them,	  and	  this	  causes	  him	  to	  despise	  and	  suffer	  of	  
himself.	  He	   is	  given	  over	   to	  psychological	   self-­‐flagellation	  –	   in	  Nietzsche’s	  own	  words,	   ‘miserable’	  and	  
‘malevolent	  against	  himself’	  –	  and	  because	  he	  also	  exercises	  perpetual	  restraint	  over	  the	  expression	  of	  
his	  own	  physical	  strength	  (he	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  concepts	  forced	  upon	  him	  by	  Christian	  morality	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to	  	  	  he	  becomes	  physically	  weak.	  The	  image	  of	  the	  sick	  and	  weakened	  man	  is	  arguably	  one	  which	  would	  
be	  widely	  met	  with	  revulsion	  –	  here	  our	  valuations	  are	  surely	  aligned	  with	  Nietzsche’s.	  	  
In	  section	  7	  of	  Antichrist,	  Nietzsche	  again	  deploys	   the	  strategy	  of	  offering	   reasons	   for	  his	  valuations	  –	  
reasons	   that	   once	   again	   appear	   to	   command	   widespread	   assent.	   Here,	   Nietzsche’s	   target	   is	   pity,	  
considered	   a	   virtue	   by	   Christian	   morality.	   The	   section	   expresses	   his	   negative	   valuation	   of	   the	  
psychological	   state	   –	   ‘Some	   have	   dared	   to	   call	   pity	   a	   virtue	   (in	   every	   noble	   ethic	   it	   is	   considered	   a	  
weakness)’	   –	   and	   seeks,	   in	   addition,	   to	   offer	   rational	   support	   for	   the	   valuation.	   So,	   Nietzsche	   first	  
observes	  that	  ‘pity	  stands	  opposed	  to	  the	  tonic	  emotions	  which	  heighten	  our	  vitality:	  it	  has	  a	  depressing	  
effect.	  We	  are	  deprived	  of	  strength	  when	  we	  feel	  pity’	   (A:	  7).	  We	  (provided	  we	  fall	  within	  Nietzsche’s	  
intended	  audience)	  are	  to	  guard	  against	  feeling	  pity,	  to	  view	  it	  as	  undesirable,	  because	  it	  results	  in	  a	  loss	  
of	  vitality	  and	  strength,	  psycho-­‐physical	   features	  central	   to	  the	  flourishing	  of	  the	  noble	  type	  Nietzsche	  
esteems	   so	  highly.	  But	  note	   that	   the	   loss	  of	   strength	  and	  vitality	  provides	  a	   consideration	   that	  would	  
exercise	  a	  pull	  (or	  push)	  on	  not	  just	  higher	  men,	  but	  on	  virtually	  anyone.	  Anyone	  with	  sufficient	  interest	  
in	  the	  preservation	  of	  his	  or	  her	  health	  or	  well-­‐being	  would	  regard	  the	  loss	  of	  these	  features	  as	  a	  reason	  
to	  revise	  his	  or	  her	  stance	  on	  pity.	  Of	  course,	  Nietzsche’s	  psychological	  claim	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  pity	  
does	  have	  the	  depressive	  effects	  he	  associates	  with	  it	   is	  open	  to	  challenge,	  and	  one	  may	  demand	  that	  
the	  claim	  be	  assessed	  for	  truth.	  But	  it	  indeed	  turns	  out	  true,	  then,	  given	  that	  there	  is,	  arguably,	  almost	  
universal	  agreement	  on	  the	  value	  of	  individual	  health,	  Nietzsche’s	  valuation	  of	  pity	  will	  draw	  assent	  from	  
a	  great	  number.	  	  
The	  next	  reason	  he	  gives	  for	  reversing	  our	  general	  valuation	  of	  pity	  will	  strike	  the	  reader	  as	  repulsive,	  
but	  must,	  when	  looked	  at	  from	  a	  distance,	  be	  recognized	  as	  having	  at	  least	  some	  force	  (or,	  as	  regarded	  
by	   Nietzsche	   as	   having	   some	   force).	  We	   are	   also	   to	   avoid	   feeling	   pity,	   Nietzsche	   tells	   us,	   because	   it	  
‘crosses	   the	   law	  of	  development’,	   or	   the	   ‘law	  of	   selection’.	   Because	  we	   feel	   pity	   for	   those	   ‘who	  have	  
been	  disinherited	   and	   condemned	  by	   life’,	  who	  are	   ‘ripe	   for	   destruction’,	  we	   are	   apt	   to	  work	   toward	  
their	  preservation.	  Thus,	  pity,	  ‘by	  the	  abundance	  of	  the	  failures	  of	  all	  kinds	  which	  it	  keeps	  alive’,	  ‘gives	  
life	   itself	  a	  gloomy	  and	  questionable	  aspect’	   (A:	  7).	   	   	  Nietzsche’s	  point	  here	   is	  that	  the	  pity	  we	  feel	  for	  
those	  born	  weak	  or	  sick,	  or	  for	  the	  naturally	  disadvantaged,	  leads	  us	  to	  strive	  to	  keep	  them	  in	  existence,	  
and	  their	  resultant	  copiousness	  encourages	  the	  belief	  that	  human	  life	  is	  somehow	  incurably	  cursed	  and	  
doomed	  to	  grave	  imperfection.	  This,	  he	  appears	  to	  think,	  would	  deepen	  the	  gloominess	  and	  depression	  
that	  stem	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  pity	  itself.	  	  Of	  course,	  it	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  Nietzsche	  has	  overstated	  
the	  extent	  of	  the	  depressive	  effects	  of	  pity	  here.	  And	  it	  might	  be	  questioned	  why	  we	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
33	  
	  
languish	   in	   depression	   at	   the	   sight	   of	   those	   ‘condemned	   by	   life’	   rather	   than	   largely	   avoid	   being	  
depressed	   by	   directing	   our	   energy	   into	   helping	   the	   latter.	   And	   it	   may	   also	   be	   suggested	   that	   the	  
pessimism	  toward	   life	   that	  Nietzsche	  suggests	  will	   result	   from	  widespread	  experience	  of	  pity	  could	  be	  
countered,	  or	  pre-­‐empted,	  by	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  supposed	  goodness	  of	  altruistic	  acts	  directed	  toward	  
those	  pitied.	  
It	  is	  probable	  that	  Nietzsche	  would	  be	  able	  to	  avail	  himself	  of	  enough	  historical	  examples	  to	  resist	  both	  
of	  our	  suggestions.	  But	  what	  is	  of	  importance	  here	  is	  that	  we	  are	  again	  seeing	  him	  attempt	  to	  support	  
his	  valuations	  with	  reasons	  many	  are	  likely	  to	  find	  somewhat	  compelling.	  If	  we	  regard	  depression,	  and	  
pessimism	   about	   the	   value	   of	   human	   life,	   being	   pervasive	   as	   an	   undesirable	   state	   of	   affairs,	   then	   it	  
seems	  as	   if	  we	  ought	  to	  accord	   lesser	  value	  to	  pity.	  Not	  only	  does	  Nietzsches	  state	  his	  own	  evaluative	  
view	  on	  pity,	  he	  also	  offers	  a	  rational	  defense	  of	  it,	  a	  defense	  which	  he	  expects	  to	  appeal	  to	  many.	  	  
In	  a	  previous	  chapter,	  we	  briefly	  discussed	  Nietzsche’s	  attack	  on	  the	  ‘unconditional	  will	  to	  truth’.	  Though	  
his	   most	   fully	   developed	   arguments	   against	   this	   will	   to	   truth	   are	   found	   in	   the	   final	   essay	   of	   the	  
Genealogy,	   it	   is	   a	   recurring	   theme	   of	   his	   writings	   (The	   Gay	   Science	   and	   Beyond	   Good	   and	   Evil	   also	  
attempt	   in	  passing	  to	  present	   it	  as	  problematic).	  And	  here	  again	  the	  attempt	   is	  made	  to	  offer	  rational	  
support	  for	  a	  (negative)	  evaluation.	  We	  often	  see	  Nietzsche	  providing	  reasons	  for	  his	  negative	  appraisal	  
of	   contemporary	   scholars’	   absolute	   commitment	   to	   truth	   (reasons	   that	   will	   be	   familiar	   from	   our	  
treatment	  of	   this	  Nietzschean	  motif	   in	   the	   last	   chapter)	  and	  which	  can	  quite	  plausibly	  be	   regarded	  as	  
inviting	  broad	  assent.	  
In	   section	  24	  of	   the	   third	   essay,	   after	   exposing	   the	   sciences’	   unrelenting	   commitment	   to	   truth	   as	   the	  
latest	  expression	  of	  the	  ascetic	  ideal,	  an	  ideal	  whose	  value	  he	  has	  been	  concerned	  to	  cast	  serious	  doubt	  
on,	  Nietzsche	  quotes	  a	  passage	  from	  an	  earlier	  work	  (section	  344	  of	  The	  Gay	  Science),	  one	  in	  which	  the	  
man	  of	  truth	  –	  ‘the	  truthful,	  in	  the	  audacious	  and	  ultimate	  sense	  presupposed	  by	  the	  faith	  in	  science’	  –	  
is	   effectively	   characterized	   as	   renouncing	   the	   actual	   world	   (‘that	   of	   life,	   nature,	   and	   history’)	   for	   a	  
metaphysical	   (and	   given	   Nietzsche’s	   consistent	   equation	   of	   the	   metaphysical	   with	   the	   illusory,	  
nonexistent)	  one	  –	  a	  normative	  universe	  shaped	  by	  the	  supreme	  authority	  of	  truth	  or	  truth-­‐stating	  (GM	  
III:	  24).	  The	  scholar	   removes	  himself	   from	   ‘life,	  nature	  and	  history’,	  all	  of	  which	  presumably	  supply	  us	  
with	  reason	  to	  (at	  least	  at	  times)	  live	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  falsehood,	  and	  which	  are	  jointly	  exhaustive	  of	  reality,	  
in	  order	  to	  immerse	  himself	  in	  a	  purely	  imagined	  evaluative	  world	  in	  which	  truth	  reigns	  supreme	  among	  
values	  and	  untruth	  is	  rejected	  without	  exception	  –	  even	  on	  occasions	  when	  it	  might	  be	  necessary	  to	  his	  
own	  flourishing	  and	  that	  of	  others.	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Though	   Nietzsche’s	   precise	   argumentative	   drift	   can	   be	   hard	   to	   follow,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   scholar’s	  
consistent	  world-­‐renunciation	  is	  supposed,	  on	  his	  view,	  to	  supply	  a	  reason	  for	  censure.	  And	  this	  reason	  
appears,	  prima	  facie,	   to	  possess	  a	  degree	  of	   force	   (even	   if	   the	   latter	  derives,	  somewhat	  paradoxically,	  
from	  the	  commitment	  we	  all	  share	  to	  truthfulness).	  The	  scholar’s	  flight	  from	  reality	  arguably	  –	  from	  ‘life,	  
nature	  and	  history’	  –	  appears	  problematic	  only	  in	  light	  of	  a	  commitment	  to	  allowing	  the	  values	  inherent	  
in	   these	   elements	   –	   which	   are	   alone	   constitutive	   of	   reality	   –	   to	   guide	   us.	   The	   individual	   who	   allows	  
himself	  to	  be	  directed	  primarily	  by	  imaginary	  values	  (or	  values	  which	  can	  be	  maintained	  only	  in	  isolation	  
from	   the	   real	   world)	   seems	   to	   be	   living	   and	   acting	   in	   a	  manner	   which	  warrants	   disapprobation.	   The	  
scholar	  whom	  Nietzsche	   criticizes	   leads	   an	   existence	   founded	   and	   centered	   on	   belief	   in	   an	   imaginary	  
(normative)	  order,	  much	  like	  the	  religious	  worshipper	  according	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  view.	  And	  his	  arguments	  
appear	  convincing	  because	  we	  all	  share	  the	  intuition	  that	  an	  utter	  withdrawal	  from	  reality	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	   scholar,	   into	   a	   purely	   invented	  metaphysical	   sphere)	   cannot	   be	   a	   course	   to	  which	   positive	   value	  
attaches.	  	  
Another	   reason	   which	   Nietzsche	   appears	   to	   give	   for	   his	   opposition	   to	   the	   will	   to	   truth	   is	   its	   lack	   of	  
justification.	   He	   describes	   scholars’	   belief	   in	   the	   value	   of	   truth	   as	   a	   ‘metaphysical	   faith’,	   using	   an	  
expression	  which	  suggests	  unsupported	  conviction.	  And	  he	  later	  develops	  the	  idea	  more	  explicitly:	  	  
Consider	  (…)	  both	  the	  earliest	  and	  most	  recent	  philosophers:	  they	  are	  all	  oblivious	  of	  
how	  much	  the	  will	  to	  truth	  itself	  first	  requires	  justification;	  here	  there	  is	  a	  lacuna	  in	  
every	  philosophy	  –	  how	  did	  this	  come	  about?	  Because	  the	  ascetic	  ideal	  has	  hitherto	  
dominated	   all	   philosophy,	   because	   truth	   was	   posited	   as	   being,	   as	   God,	   as	   the	  
highest	  court	  of	  appeal	  –	  because	   truth	  was	  not	  permitted	   to	  be	  a	  problem	  at	  all.	  
(GM	  III:	  )	  	  
So	   no	   attempt,	   in	  Nietzsche’s	   view,	   has	   ever	   been	  made	   to	   defend	   the	   proposition	   that	   truth	   carries	  
overriding	  value,	  and	  Nietzsche	  appears	  convinced	  both	  that	  no	  adequate	  justification	  can	  be	  invoked	  in	  
support	   of	   it,	   and	   that	   there	   are,	   furthermore,	   compelling	   reasons	   for	   rejecting	   it.	   These	   reasons	   are	  
physiological	  and	  related	  to	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  optimal	  human	  flourishing.	  Scholarship,	  he	  tells	  
us,	  is	  a	  pursuit	  which	  cannot	  be	  begun	  without	  ‘an	  impoverishment	  of	  life’	  –	  ‘the	  affects	  grown	  cool,	  the	  
tempo	  of	  life	  slowed	  down,	  dialectics	  in	  place	  of	  instinct,	  seriousness	  imprinted	  on	  faces	  and	  gestures’.	  
The	  last	  of	  these	  features	  Nietzsche	  considers	  ‘the	  most	  unmistakable	  sign	  of	  a	  labored	  metabolism,	  of	  
struggling,	  laborious	  life’	  (GM	  III:	  ).	  His	  characterizations	  of	  the	  scholar	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  he	  regards	  
the	   physiological	   presuppositions	   of	   scholarship	   as	   detrimental	   to	   the	   health	   and	   flourishing	   of	   an	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individual.	   Scholarship,	   which	   is	   the	   will	   to	   truth	   incarnate,	   requires	   the	   individual	   partaking	   of	   it	   to	  
curtail	  his	  own	  well-­‐being.	  	  
So,	   we	   once	   again	   see	   that	   Nietzsche	   has	   offered	   a	   defense	   of	   his	   own	   evaluative	   claims,	   a	   defense	  
which	   relies	   on	   reasons	   with	   considerable	   intuitive	   pull.	   The	   first	   of	   these	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   rational	  
justification,	  an	  origin	  in	  faith	  without	  rational	  support.	  The	  second	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  strong	  reasons	  for	  
assigning	   to	   the	  unconditional	  will	   to	   truth	  a	  negative	  valence.	  These	  have	   to	  do	  with	   its	   requiring	  an	  
impoverishment	  of	  life,	  a	  diminishing	  of	  physiological	  well-­‐being,	  in	  order	  to	  take	  root.	  Foot’s	  suggestion	  
that	  Nietzsche	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  realist	  of	  sorts	  gains	  plausibility	  in	  light	  of	  a	  recurring	  tendency	  in	  his	  
works	  to	  offer	  reasons	  for	  valuations	  that	  appear	  (or	  are	  taken	  by	  Nietzsche	  himself)	  to	  have	  widespread	  
appeal.	   Though	   Nietzsche	   is	   often	   regarded	   as	   one	   of	   the	   most	   radical	   and	   unpalatable	   of	   thinkers,	  
careful	  scrutiny	  reveals	  considerable	  overlap	  between	  his	  evaluative	  beliefs	  and	  ours.	  We	  shall	  now	  see	  
that	  the	  traits	  that	  Nietzsche	  sees	  as	  definitive	  of	  higher	  types	  are	  also	  traits	  which	  we	  value	  highly.	  	  
In	   his	   landmark	   study	   on	   Nietzsche’s	   moral	   philosophy,	   Leiter	   (2002)	   offers	   an	   account	   of	   the	  
characteristics	  which	   Nietzsche	   ascribes	   to	   his	   higher	   types.	   Nietzsche’s	   scattered	   descriptions	   of	   the	  
latter,	  Leiter	  suggests,	  attribute	  to	  them	  five	  main	  features.	  Leiter	  further	  proposes	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  
all	  five	  features	  in	  a	  given	  individual	  is	  necessary	  for	  him	  or	  her	  to	  be	  properly	  considered	  a	  higher	  type.	  
The	  first	  of	  these	  features	  is	  an	  inclination	  toward	  living	  in	  solitude	  and	  to	  regarding	  other	  human	  beings	  
as	   mere	   instruments.	   Next	   is	   an	   overwhelming	   propensity	   to	   seek	   out	   heavy	   burdens	   and	  
responsibilities,	  or	  to	  devise	  and	  pursue	  the	  most	  challenging	  projects,	  as	  Nietzsche	  himself	  did	  when	  he	  
undertook	  a	  revaluation	  of	  prevailing	  values.	  Third	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  recover	  from	  potentially	  devastating	  
setbacks	  and	  emerge	  stronger	  than	  before.	  Nietzsche	  himself	  seemed	  to	  embody	  this	  ability,	  apparently	  
using	  his	   recurring	  and	  debilitating	   illness	  as	  a	  means	  of	  overcoming	  his	  pessimism	  and	  producing	  his	  
best	   works	   in	   spite	   of	   it.	   Being	   healthy	   and	   resilient	   in	   this	   sense	   also	   entails	   having	   the	   ability	   to	  
instinctively	  recognize	  and	  adopt	  the	  means	  which	  would	  allow	  one	  to	  overcome	  the	  ‘wretched	  states’	  
afflicting	  one,	  and	  to	  ensuring	  the	  enhancement	  of	  one’s	  strength.	  	  
Fourth	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  affirm	  one’s	  life,	  even	  its	  most	  painful	  aspects	  and	  moments,	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  
that	  one	   is	  able	   to	  will	   its	  eternal	   recurrence.	   Last	   is	  a	   certain	   ‘distinctive	  bearing	   towards	  others	  and	  
especially	  towards	  himself	  :	  he	  has	  self-­‐reverence’	  (Leiter	  2002:	  120);	  the	  higher	  type	  regards	  himself	  as	  
irreducibly	  superior,	  and	  as	  the	  author	  of	  the	  values	  which	  determine	  his	  own	  worth.	  He	  does	  not	  regard	  
the	  values	  of	  others	  as	  having	  any	  authority	  over	  him,	  being	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  ‘fundamental	  certainty	  
that	  the	  noble	  soul	  has	  about	  itself’	  (BGE:	  287).	  The	  higher	  individual’s	  distinctive	  bearing	  is,	  for	  Leiter,	  a	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complex	  of	  related	  attitudes	  and	  tendencies	  which	  include	  the	  following:	  ‘(He)	  honours	  himself	  as	  one	  
who	  is	  powerful	  ,	  also	  as	  one	  who	  has	  power	  over	  himself,	  who	  knows	  how	  to	  speak	  and	  be	  silent,	  who	  
delights	   in	  being	   severe	  and	  hard	  with	  himself	   and	   respects	  all	   severity	  and	  hardness’	   (BGE:	  260).	  His	  
knowledge	  that	  suffering	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  cultivation	  of	  greatness	  also	  leaves	  him	  poorly	  disposed	  to	  
the	  common	  pursuit	  of	  happiness.	  	  	  	  
Leiter’s	   account	   furnishes	  a	   significant	  part	  of	   the	   content	  of	  Nietzsche’s	   theory	  of	   value.	   If	  Nietzsche	  
ascribes	  positive	  value	  to	  higher	  types,	  then	  he	  must	  also	  value	  their	  essential	  traits,	  the	  characteristics	  
in	  virtue	  of	  which	  they	  are	  such	  types.	  He	  must	  value	  them	  for	  these	  traits.	  But	  these	  traits	  appear	  to	  
have	  considerable	  appeal	  to	  us	  too.	  The	  first	  feature	  of	  higher	  individuals,	  their	  natural	  love	  of	  solitude	  
and	  readiness	  to	  treat	  other	  human	  beings	  as	  mere	  instruments	  may	  initially	  seem	  repugnant	  to	  us,	  but	  
our	   negative	   reactions	  might	   be	   tempered	   by	   the	   realization	   that	   such	   inclinations	  may	   be	   necessary	  
conditions	   for	  heightened	  artistic	  productivity.	  And	   if	  we	  valued	  rare,	  great	  artists	  and	  the	  works	   they	  
produced,	  we	  might	  even	   find	  ourselves	  valuing	   the	   conditions	  presupposed	  by	   their	  emergence,	  and	  
granting	  them	  the	  right	  to	  treat	  others	  only	  as	  means	  to	  their	  own	  artistic	  ends.	  And	  the	  other	  central	  
features	  of	  higher	   individuals	   appear	   somewhat	   less	   controversial	   and	  easier	   to	   approve	  of.	  Who,	   for	  
instance,	   could	   fail	   to	   find	   attractive	   resilience	   to	   illness	   and	  other	   adverse	   conditions,	   or	   the	  natural	  
ability	  to	  discern	  the	  means	  by	  which	  one	  can	  ensure	  one’s	  own	  flourishing	  and	  avoid	  obstacles	  to	  it?	  	  
Who	   could	   not	   admire	   and	   aspire	   to	   emulate	   the	   individual	  who	   could	   affirm	  his	   own	  existence,	   and	  
embrace	  fate,	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  as	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  willing	  its	  eternal	  recurrence?	  Who	  could	  not	  aspire	  
in	  many	  aspects	   to	  embody	  the	   faith	   to	  which	  Nietzsche	  gives	   the	  name	   ‘Dionysian’,	   to	   ‘become	  free’	  
and	   ‘stand	  amid	  the	  cosmos	  with	  a	   joyous	  and	  trusting	   fatalism’,	  who	   is	  able	   to	  be	  tolerant	   ‘not	   from	  
weakness	   but	   from	   strength’	   	   (TI	   IX:	   49)?	  When	   Nietzsche	   describes	   things	   so	   enticingly,	   it	   is	   almost	  
impossible	  for	  us	  (including	  those	  of	  us	  whom	  Nietzsche	  would	  consider	  lower	  types)	  to	  not	  ascribe	  to	  
such	  capacities	  a	  positive	  valence	  and	  even	  (perhaps	  vainly)	  thirst	  after	  them.	  	  
Though	  we	  might	  be	  hesitant	   to	  praise	   in	   an	  unqualified	  manner	   the	  higher	   individual’s	   resistance	   to	  
common	  patterns	  of	  evaluation	  and	  his	  determination	  to	  remain	  aloof	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  humanity,	  there	  is	  
something	  that	  many	  of	  us	  will	  undeniably	  admire	  about	  him,	  and	  this	  is	  perhaps	  best	  characterized	  as	  
his	   lofty	   spiritual	   independence	   and	   strength.	   Self-­‐confidence	   and	   self-­‐discipline,	   possessed	   by	   the	  
higher	   individual	   to	   an	   extraordinary	   degree,	   are	   widely	   regarded	   as	   virtues.	   His	   ability	   to	   resolutely	  
fashion	   himself	   after	   a	   conception	   of	   what	   he	   would	   like	   himself	   to	   be	   also	   strikes	   us	   as	   greatly	  
praiseworthy.	   So,	  we	   find	   that	  many	  of	   the	   traits	  by	  which	   the	  higher	   types	   can	  be	  distinguished	  and	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which	  endear	   them	  to	  Nietzsche	  also	   invites	  a	  positive	  evaluative	   response	   from	  us.	   Foot’s	   claim	   that	  
Nietzsche’s	  valuations	  find	  broad	  resonance	  with	  us	  does	  not	  sound	  as	  far-­‐fetched	  as	  Leiter	  suggests.	  	  
	  
	  
Nietzsche’s	  realist-­‐sounding	  rhetoric	  
Leiter	  next	  turns	  to	  a	  feature	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  writings	  often	  taken	  to	  provide	  a	  presumption	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  
endorsing	  a	  realist	   reading:	   the	  sheer	   force	  and	  conviction	  with	  which	  he	  seems	  wont	  to	  affirming	  his	  
own	  evaluative	  position	  over	  that	  structured	  by	  slave	  morality.	  As	  Leiter	  puts	  it,	  ‘Nietzsche	  simply	  does	  
not	  write	   like	   someone	  who	   thinks	  his	   evaluative	   judgments	   are	  merely	  his	   idiosyncratic	   preferences’	  
(Leiter	   2002:	   153).	   Nietzsche,	   he	   points	   out,	   takes	   the	   side	   of	   the	   evaluative	   position	   he	   adopts	  with	  
‘such	  force,	  such	  polemical	  ferocity,	  that	  it	  seems	  hard	  to	  think	  of	  (him)	  as	  really	  believing	  (…)	  that	  the	  
evaluative	  judgments	  he	  thrusts	  upon	  his	  readers	  reflect	  no	  objective	  fact	  of	  the	  matter,	  that	  they	  admit	  
of	   no	   objective	   grounding	   for	   those	  who	  do	  not	   share	  what	   simply	   happens	   to	   be	   (his	   )	   idiosyncratic	  
tastes’	  (2002:	  153).	  Nietzsche’s	  apparently	  overbearing	  rhetoric	  where	  questions	  of	  value	  are	  concerned	  
makes	  it	  seem	  unlikely	  that	  he	  would	  regard	  his	  evaluative	  claims	  as	  having	  no	  pull	  on	  those	  who	  did	  not	  
share	   his	   ‘evaluative	   tastes’,	   that	   he	   would	   see	   their	   authority	   as	   conditioned	   solely	   on	   subjective	  
acceptance	  of	  them,	  that	  he	  would	  accept	  that	  those	  who	  resisted	  them	  could	  be	  immune	  to	  charges	  of	  
irrationality.	  Leiter	  proceeds	  to	  offer	  examples	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  ostensibly	  realist	  rhetoric	  before	  arguing	  
that	  making	  the	  inference	  from	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  latter	  to	  any	  realist	  interpretive	  conclusions	  would	  
be	  unjustified.	  	  
Leiter	   is	   surely	   right	   that	   Nietzsche’s	   style	   offers	   the	   realist	   reader	   little	   support	   if	   purely	   rhetorical.	  
There	   is	   little	  reason	  why	  one	  should	  expect,	   for	   instance,	  a	  metaethical	  non-­‐cognitivist	  to	  be	  any	   less	  
forceful	   and	   self-­‐assured	   than	   a	   realist	   in	   stating	   his	   evaluative	   position.	   The	   late	   R.	   M.	   Hare,	   for	  
example,	   famously	   developed	   and	   held	   a	   version	   of	   non-­‐cognitivism	   which	   came	   to	   be	   known	   as	  
‘prescriptivism’.	  But	  this	  did	  not	  stop	  him	  from	  staunchly	  defending	  a	  type	  of	  preference	  utilitarianism.	  
The	  debate	  on	  whether	  one’s	  metaethical	  commitments	  need	  have	  any	  bearing	  on	  the	  content	  of	  one’s	  
ethical	  views	  is	  far	  from	  yielding	  a	  final	  answer,	  and	  it	  appears	  that	  even	  those	  whose	  views	  about	  the	  
semantics	   of	   value	   judgment	   are	   compatible	   with	   or	   presuppose	   antirealism	   about	   value	   could	   avail	  
themselves	  of	  compelling	  reasons	  for	  –	  confidently	  –	  issuing	  and	  employing	  such	  judgments.	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J.	  L	  Mackie,	  for	  instance,	  first	  seeks,	  in	  his	  most	  famous	  work,	  to	  show	  that	  values	  are	  nowise	  part	  of	  the	  
objective	  world,	  before	  going	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  though	  they	  must	  be	  invented,	  talk	  of,	  and	  belief	  in,	  them	  
remains	  of	  great	  utility	  (Mackie	  197).	  And	  it	  would	  not	  be	  far-­‐fetched,	  given	  the	  importance	  he	  gives	  to	  
value	  creation	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  practical	  nihilism,	  to	  suppose	  that	  Nietzsche	  might	  have	  held	  a	  similar	  
view.	  So,	   it	  certainly	  does	  seem	  as	  if	  the	  authoritative	  tone	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  remarks	  on	  value	  can,	  when	  
taken	   alone,	   offer	   the	   realist	   interpreter	   little	   comfort.	  What	   features	   would	   Nietzsche’s	   writings	   on	  
value	  have	  to	  include,	  apart	  from	  their	  forcefulness,	  for	  the	  realist	  reader’s	  case	  to	  appear	  convincing?	  
Leiter	  suggests	  that	  they	  would	  have	  to	  employ	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘epistemic	  value	  terms’	  –	  ‘the	  language	  
of	  truth	  and	  falsity,	  real	  and	  unreal’	  (2002:	  154),	  for	  example;	  Nietzsche’s	  works	  would	  have	  to	  feature	  
claims	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  evaluative	  assertions	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  modern	  morality	  are	  false,	  or	  at	  odds	  
with	  reality,	  or	  claims	  to	  the	  effect	   that	  his	  own	  evaluations	  –	  of	   the	  strong,	   independent	   type	  whose	  
emergence	  he	  sees	  as	  under	  threat	  from	  morality’s	  prevalence	  –	  are	  true.	   	  The	  presence	  of	  talk	  of	  his	  
own	  value	  judgments	  being	  true	  (or	  those	  of	  his	  opponents’	  being	  false)	  would,	  Leiter	  suggests,	  suffice	  
to	  prove	  that	  Nietzsche	  was	  indeed	  committed	  to	  some	  form	  of	  realism.	  Leiter	  observes	  that	  epistemic	  
value	  terms	  are	  ‘strikingly	  absent’	  from	  Nietzsche’s	  remarks	  on	  value,	  and	  takes	  this	  as	  reason	  to	  reject	  a	  
realist	  construal	  of	  his	  metaethics	  (2002:	  155).	  
	  Two	  ways	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  forcefulness	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  expression	  which	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  a	  realist	  
reading	  also,	  he	  proposes,	  significantly	  weaken	  the	  case	  for	  the	  latter:	  first,	  Nietzsche	  views	  himself	  as	  
responding	  to	  an	  urgent	  need	  –	  to	  supply	  the	  jolt	  required	  to	  make	  potentially	  great	  men	  see	  prevailing	  
patterns	  of	  valuing	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  their	  growth	  into,	  and	  flourishing	  qua,	  higher	  types	  (2002:	  155).	  The	  
significance	   and	   urgency	   Nietzsche	   accords	   his	   task,	   Leiter	   suggests,	   leads	   him	   to	   feel	   justified	   in	  
employing	  whatever	  means	   apparently	   necessary	   for	   its	   accomplishment	   –	   representation	  of	   his	   own	  
evaluative	  position	  (privately	  regarded	  by	  Nietzsche	  as	  a	  mere	  product	  of	  his	  own	  idiosyncratic	  tastes)	  as	  
authoritative,	   or	   admitting	   of	   intersubjective	   or	   objective	   justification,	   included.	   Nietzsche	   condemns	  
slavish	  types	  and	  their	  values	  with	  such	  overwhelming	  force	  and	  conviction	  not	  because	  he	  is	  in	  the	  grip	  
of	  realist	  commitments,	  but	  because	  he	  believes	  that	  such	  rhetorical	  vehemence	   is	   indispensable	  with	  
regards	   to	  disabusing	   (potentially)	   higher	   types	  of	   the	   false	   consciousness	   they	  have	  historically	   been	  
lured	   into	  by	   the	  weak.	  Nietzsche’s	  attempts	   to	   sound	  expressively	   realist	  about	  values	  do	  not	   reflect	  
any	  corresponding	  theoretical	  commitments,	  but	  are	  motivated	  by	  purely	  strategic	  concerns.	  	  
Leiter	  also	  suggests	  another	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  apparently	  realist	  rhetoric.	  The	   latter,	  
he	  says,	  should	  be	  taken	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  intense	  frustration	  at	  the	  lack	  of	  attention	  among	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his	  contemporaries	  to	  his	  work.	  The	  increasing	  shrillness	  of	  the	  tenor	  of	  his	  works	  is,	  according	  to	  Leiter,	  
best	  explained	  by	  his	  chagrin	  at	  being	  ignored,	  and,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  language	  of	  
truth	   and	   falsity	   at	   points	   where	   discussion	   centers	   on	   questions	   of	   value,	   not	   by	   any	   sort	   of	   realist	  
commitment	  (2002:	  155).	  	  So,	  to	  recapitulate,	  the	  reasons	  provided	  by	  Leiter	  for	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  realist	  
reading	  are	  the	  apparent	  absence	  of	  epistemic	  value	  terms	  from	  Nietzsche’s	  statements	  regarding	  value,	  
and	  that	  his	  forceful	  style	  is	  best	  seen	  either	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  certain	  –	  solely	  practical	  –	  concerns	  or	  
his	  angst	  at	  having	  been	  given	  the	  cold	  shoulder	  by	  his	  peers.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  examine	  these	  reasons	  in	  
turn.	  	  
It	  should	  first	  be	  observed	  that	  Leiter’s	  second	  and	  third	  reasons	  for	  resisting	  the	  realist	  interpretation	  
are	  surprisingly	  ad	  hominem.	  That	   is,	  they	  depend	  little	  on	  actual	  readings	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  texts,	  but	  on	  
psychological	   interpretations	   of	   the	   man	   himself.	   And	   it	   seems	   uncontroversial	   to	   point	   out	   that	  
interpretations	   based	   on	   textual	   evidence	   should,	   under	   most	   conditions,	   be	   preferred	   over	  
interpretations	  that	  resort	  to	  speculation	  regarding	  the	  author’s	  unspoken	  aims	  or	  mental	  states.	   	  The	  
next	  point	  to	  note	  is	  that	  the	  plausibility	  of	  these	  reasons	  rests	  significantly	  upon	  that	  of	  the	  first	  –	  that	  
Nietzsche’s	  writings	  on	  value	  feature	  no	  epistemic	  value	  terms	  like	  ‘true’	  and	  ‘false’.	  If	  it	  can	  be	  shown	  
that	  Leiter’s	  observation	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  is	  inaccurate	  (that	  is,	  that	  Nietzsche	  does	  say	  things	  to	  the	  
effect	  that	  the	  value	  judgments	  of	  those	  he	  attacks	  are	  false	  or	  that	  his	  own	  value	  judgments	  are	  true),	  
we	   would	   at	   once	   be	   compelled	   to	   favour	   the	   realist	   reading	   and	   to	   dismiss	   his	   second	   and	   third	  
reasons.	   Put	   differently,	   it	   is	   largely	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   evidence	   that	  Nietzsche	   employs	   the	   so-­‐called	  
epistemic	  value	  terms	  that	  Leiter’s	  alternative	  explanations	  of	  the	  force	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  rhetoric	  appear	  
reasonable.	   If	  Nietzsche	  did	   show	  clear	   signs	  of	  employing	   the	  epistemic	   value	   terms,	   then	  we	  would	  
have	  strong	  reason	  to	  ascribe	  to	  him	  some	  form	  of	  metaethical	  realism,	  and	  it	  would	  make	  no	  sense	  to	  
seek	  competing	  explanations	  for	  his	  use	  of	  these	  terms.	  	  
Leiter	  says	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  epistemic	  value	  terms	  from	  Nietzsche’s	  writings	  on	  value	  is	  particularly	  
striking	   when	   the	   latter	   are	   viewed	   alongside	   his	   remarks	   on	   religion.	   Many	   of	   his	   statements	   on	  
religion,	  Leiter	  rightly	  observes,	  accuse	  it	  of	  sowing	  and	  perpetuating	  falsehoods.	  Nietzsche,	  he	  says,	  ‘in	  
his	  equally	   forceful	  attacks	  on,	  e.g.	  Christian	  cosmology,	  or	   religious	   interpretations	  of	  natural	  events,	  
(..)	   invokes	  the	  conceptual	  apparatus	  of	   truth	  and	  falsity,	   truth	  and	   lie,	   reality	  and	  appearance,	  all	   the	  
time’	  (2002:	  154).	  He	  quotes	  from	  a	  famous	  section	  of	  The	  Antichrist,	  in	  which	  Nietzsche	  writes	  that	  the	  
Christian	   interpretation	   of	   the	   world	   lacks	   ‘even	   a	   single	   point	   of	   contact	   with	   reality’	   and	   that	   it	  
amounts	   to	  a	  piece	  of	   ‘pure	   fiction’	  which	   ‘falsifies	   reality’,	  positing	  a	   range	  of	   ‘imaginary	  causes’	  and	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‘imaginary	  effects’	   in	  order	   to	  keep	  reality	  concealed	   from	  those	  who	  suffer	  of	   it.	   Leiter	   suggests	   that	  
Nietzsche	  never,	  at	  any	  point	  in	  his	  writings,	  makes	  similar	  claims	  about	  evaluative	  judgments	  –	  claims	  
about	  their	  truth	  or	  falsity.	  This	  divergence	  is	  supposed	  to	  supply	  strong	  evidence	  for	  Nietzsche’s	  having	  
been	  a	  realist	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  holding	  that	  there	  are	  facts	  of	  the	  matter	  –	  about	  the	  religious	  but	  not	  
about	  the	  evaluative.	  	  
Unfortunately,	  Leiter’s	  observations	  do	  not	  survive	  closer	  scrutiny	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  texts.	  Indeed,	  the	  very	  
section	  that	  Leiter	   invokes	  directs	   its	  criticisms	  at	  both	  Christian	  religion	  and	  morality:	   its	  opening	   line	  
declares,	   ‘In	  Christianity	  neither	  morality	  nor	  religion	  has	  a	  single	  point	  of	  contact	  with	  reality’	  (A:	  15).	  
While	  Leiter	  may	  argue	  that	  Nietzsche	  appears	  here	  to	  really	  mean	  by	  ‘morality’	  the	  metaphysical	  claims	  
which	  underpin	  the	  judgments	  of	  Christian	  morality	  (for	  instance,	  the	  belief	  concerning	  the	  existence	  of	  
free	  will),	  Nietzsche’s	   inclusion	  of	   ‘sin’	  as	  an	  example	  of	   the	   ‘imaginary	  effects’	  posited	  by	  Christianity	  
tells	  us	  that	  on	  his	  view,	  the	  entities	  referred	  to	  by	  various	  moral	  judgments	  (for	  instance,	  judgments	  of	  
the	  form	  ‘X	  is	  sinful’)	  are	  among	  those	  people	  have,	  traditionally,	  falsely	  projected	  on	  to	  the	  world.	  	  
In	  sections	  8	  and	  9	  of	  the	  same	  work,	  Nietzsche	  launches	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  evaluative	  perspective	  of	  the	  
‘theologian’	  or	  priestly	  type,	  one	  which	  makes	  extensive	  use	  of	  Leiter’s	  epistemic	  value	  terms.	  In	  section	  
8,	   the	   ‘idealist’,	   regarded	   by	   Nietzsche	   as	   sharing	   the	   evaluative	   commitments	   of	   the	   theologian	   or	  
priest,	   is	   characterized	   as	   nursing	   a	   ‘benevolent	   contempt’	   for	   the	   ‘understanding’,	   the	   ‘senses’,	  
‘honours’,	   ‘good	   living’	  and	   ‘science’,	  as	  considering	   them	   ‘beneath	  him’.	  He	   takes	   the	  utmost	  care	   to	  
distance	   himself	   from	   them,	   seeking	   instead	   to	   become	   the	   embodiment	   of	   ‘humility’,	   ‘chastity’	   and	  
‘poverty’,	   to	  have	  his	   spirit	  hover	  over	   the	  afore-­‐stated	   ‘vices’	   in	  a	   state	  of	   ‘pure	   for-­‐itselfness’	   (A:	  8).	  
This	   evaluative	   standpoint	   is	   then	   denounced	   by	   Nietzsche	   not	   only	   for	   having	   ‘harmed	   life	  
immeasurably	  more	  than	  any	  horrors	  or	  vices’	  and	  for	  relying	  on	  a	  notion	  of	  the	  spirit	  (‘the	  pure	  spirit’)	  
that	   is	   ‘the	   pure	   lie’,	   but	   also	   for	   standing	   truth	   on	   its	   head.	   ‘As	   long	   as	   the	   priest	   is	   considered	   the	  
higher	  type	  of	  man’,	  Nietzsche	  tells	  us,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  evaluative	  judgments	  he	  issues	  are	  heeded,	  	  
there	  is	  no	  answer	  to	  the	  question:	  what	  is	  truth?	  For	  truth	  has	  been	  stood	  on	  its	  head	  when	  
conscious	  advocate	  of	  nothingness	  and	  negation	  is	  accepted	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  ‘truth’	  
(emphasis	  mine).	  (A:	  8)	  
Nietzsche	  should	  not,	  of	  course,	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	   there	   is	   really	  no	   fact	  of	   the	  matter	   regarding	  
which	  evaluative	  position	  –	  that	  of	  the	  priest	  or	  that	  which	  affirms	  ‘life’,	  or	  the	  ‘senses’,	  ‘honours’,	  ‘good	  
living’,	   etc.	   –	   is	   correct.	  What	   he	  means	   is,	   rather,	   that	   the	   right	   answer	   regarding	   which	   evaluative	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standpoint	   is	   to	  be	  preferred	  will	   never	   come	   to	   light,	  or	  will	   always	  be	  vilified	  as	   the	  wrong	  answer.	  
When	   the	  priest	   is	   seen	  as	   the	   final	   authority	  on	   the	   correctness	  of	   value	   judgments	   and	  proffers	  his	  
own	  evaluations	  as	   the	   truth,	  and	   succeeds	   in	   convincing	  others	   that	   they	  are	   indeed	   true,	   ‘truth	  has	  
been	  stood	  on	  its	  head’.	  Nietzsche’s	  claims	  here	  are	  unambiguously	  realist.	  The	  priest’s	  evaluations	  are	  
false	  or	  misguided,	  because,	  if	  adopted,	  they	  prevent	  people	  from	  attaining	  anything	  like	  their	  full	  vigour	  
and	  limit	  them	  to	  a	  wretched	  existence.	  To	  say	  that	  the	  priest’s	  valuations	  stand	  truth	  on	  its	  head	  is	  to	  
say	  that	  they	  are	  the	  very	  opposite	  of	  the	  truth,	  or	  falsehoods.	  So,	  Nietzsche	  does	  employ	  the	  epistemic	  
value	  terms	  when	  talking	  about	  values	  –	  he	  quite	  explicitly	  describes	  certain	  patterns	  of	  evaluation	  as	  
false.	  
Section	   9	   continues	   Nietzsche’s	   attack	   on	   priestly	   values.	   The	   ‘theologian’s	   instinct’	   against	   which	  
Nietzsche	  declares	  war	   in	  the	  opening	   line	  must	  clearly	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  evaluative	   instinct,	  or	  more	  
precisely,	   as	   constituted	   by	   certain	   evaluative	   tendencies	   or	   equated	   with	   certain	   value	   judgments,	  
since,	  in	  the	  preceding	  section,	  it	  is	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  priest’s	  valuations	  that	  is	  addressed.	  Nietzsche	  
then	  declares,	  ‘Whatever	  the	  theologian	  feels	  to	  be	  true	  must	  be	  false:	  this	  is	  almost	  a	  criterion	  of	  truth’	  
(A:	  9).	  What	  is	  undeniably	  at	  issue	  here	  is	  the	  epistemic	  value	  of	  the	  priest’s	  value	  judgments:	  
Wherever	   the	   theologians	   instinct	  extends,	  value	   judgments	  have	  been	  stood	  on	   their	  
heads	  and	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘true’	  and	  ‘false’	  are	  of	  necessity	  reversed:	  whatever	  is	  most	  
harmful	   to	   life	   is	   called	   ‘true’;	  whatever	  elevates	   it,	   enhances,	   affirms,	   justifies	   it,	   and	  
makes	  it	  triumphant,	  is	  called	  ‘false’	  (A:	  9).	  	  
Even	  though	  Nietzsche	  fails	  to	  make	  clear	  here	  precisely	  what	  to	  his	  mind	  are	  rightly	  described	  as	  true	  
and	  false,	  we	  appear	  entitled	  to	  certain	  conjectures.	  First,	  the	  claim	  he	  makes	  earlier	  in	  the	  section	  that	  
‘this	   faulty	  perspective	  on	  all	   things	   is	  elevated	   into	  a	  morality,	  a	  virtue,	  and	  a	  holiness’	   (A:	  9)	   tells	  us	  
that	   it	   is	   the	   theologian’s	  valuations	  and	  not	  his	  metaphysical	  worldview	  that	   is	  being	  considered	  and	  
assailed	  here.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  he	  mentions	  the	  metaphysical	  concepts	  ‘God’,	  ‘redemption’,	  and	  ‘eternity’,	  
but	  he	  does	  so	  only	  in	  the	  course	  of	  suggesting	  that	  the	  theologians’	  evaluative	  perspective	  is	  considered	  
‘sancrosanct’	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  true	  –	  once	  it	  incorporates	  these	  notions	  and	  uses	  them	  to	  prop	  itself	  up.	  
The	  Christian	  evaluative	  perspective	  is	  invested	  with	  absolute	  value	  once	  it	  becomes	  associated	  with	  the	  
notions	  of	   ‘God’,	   ‘redemption’,	  and	   ‘eternity’,	  and	  once	   it	  attains	   this	  position	  of	  absolute	  privilege	  all	  
other	  value	  judgments,	  including	  those	  which	  characterize	  the	  quasi-­‐aristocratic	  evaluative	  perspective	  
which	   Nietzsche	   favours	   and	   regards	   as	   most	   conducive	   to	   human	   flourishing	   are	   degraded	   and	  
abandoned.	  So,	  it	  is	  Christian	  values	  and	  not	  Christian	  metaphysics	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  attack	  is	  directed	  at	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in	  this	  section.	  But	  if	  it	  is	  Christian	  values	  that	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  criticism	  here,	  then	  he	  must	  
mean	  the	  epistemic	  value	  terms	  he	  employs	  to	  apply	  not	  to	  Christian	  metaphysics	  but	  to	  Christian	  value	  
judgments,	  and	  Leiter’s	  observation	  that	  only	  the	  former	  is	  ever	  evaluated	  for	  epistemic	  worth	  cannot	  
be	  right.	  	  
In	   the	  preface	   to	   the	   same	  work,	  Nietzsche	   lists	   among	   the	   conditions	  under	  which	  his	  works	  will	   be	  
understood	  the	  development	  of	  ‘a	  new	  conscience	  for	  truths	  that	  have	  so	  far	  remained	  mute’	  (A:	  Pref)	  
While	  the	  range	  of	  ‘truths’	  Nietzsche	  sought	  to	  present	  in	  his	  works	  was	  certainly	  vast,	  there	  can	  be	  little	  
doubt	   that	  he	   saw	  his	   evaluative	  or	   revaluative	   claims	  as	   falling	  within	   it.	   So,	   such	   ‘truths’	  would,	   for	  
Nietzsche,	   include,	   among	   others,	   his	   distinctive	   claims	   about	   the	   value,	   or	   disvalue,	   of	   pity,	   and	  
regarding	  ‘a	  kind	  of	  overman’	  (A:	  4)	  ‘being	  higher	  in	  value’	  and	  ‘worthier	  of	  life’	  (A:	  3).	  	  But	  if	  Nietzsche	  
describes	   his	   own	   evaluative	   claims	   as	   ‘truths’,	   then	   he	   clearly	   regards	   the	   epistemic	   value	   terms	   as	  
applying	  to	  them	  –	  calling	  them	  ‘truths’	  is	  to	  apply	  an	  epistemic	  value	  term	  to	  them.	  	  
And	   in	   section	   4,	   he	   calls	   the	   idea	   that	   ‘mankind	   (…)	   represent(s)	   a	   development	   toward	   something	  
better	  or	   stronger	  or	  higher	   in	   the	   sense	  accepted	   today’	   ‘a	   false	   idea’	   (A:	   4).	  He	   is	   here	  denying	   the	  
widely	   entrenched	  modern	   belief	   that	   mankind’s	   cultural	   –	   in	   particular,	   moral	   –	   evolution	   over	   the	  
millennia	  should	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  yielded	  a	  superior	  sort	  of	  human	  being.	  Instead,	  he	  tells	  us,	  ‘the	  
European	  of	  today	  is	  vastly	  inferior	  in	  value	  to	  the	  European	  of	  the	  Renaissance’	  (A:	  4).	  So,	  we	  have	  here	  
an	  instance	  of	  Nietzsche	  disputing	  an	  evaluative	  belief	  held	  by	  others	  and	  explicitly	  calling	  it	  ‘false’.	  The	  
belief	   that	   the	   human	   species	   has	   been	   improved	   upon	   or	   made	   better	   since	   the	   time	   of	   the	  
Renaissance	  is,	  for	  Nietzsche,	  mistaken,	  and	  his	  application	  of	  an	  epistemic	  value	  term	  to	  an	  evaluative	  
claim	   once	   again	   lends	   support	   to	   the	   realist	   reading.	   Because	   Leiter’s	   arguments	   against	   the	   realist	  
reading	  rest	  so	  much	  on	  his	  claim	  that	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	   regard	  evaluative	   judgments	  –	  whether	  his	  
own	   or	   those	   of	   others	   –	   as	   admitting	   of	   epistemic	   evaluation,	   they	   are,	   in	   the	   final	   analysis,	  
unsuccessful.	  	  
Leiter	  offers	  us	  a	  further	  reason	  for	  rejecting	  the	  realist	  reading:	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  attempt	  by	  Nietzsche	  to	  
state	  the	  objective	  facts	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  various	  characteristics	  and	  types	  of	  people	  are	  ‘high’	  or	  ‘low’,	  
or	   ‘good’	   or	   ‘bad’.	   Rather	   than	   offer	   us	   an	   account	   of	   the	   objective	   facts	   that	   make	   the	   types	   of	  
individual,	  psychological	  qualities,	  and	  values	  he	  inveighs	  against	  ‘low’	  or	  ‘bad’,	  Leiter	  argues,	  Nietzsche	  
merely	  subjects	  them	  to	  a	  ‘polemical	  and	  evaluatively	  laden	  characterization’	  (2002:	  152).	  And	  if	  there	  
were	  any	  objective	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  about	  whether	  such	  individuals,	  qualities	  and	  values	  were	  ‘low’	  or	  
‘high’,	   then	  we	  would	  expect	  him	   to	   cite	   the	   relevant	   facts	   in	  defense	  of	  his	   valuations.	  And	  because	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Leiter	   finds	  any	  mention	  of	   such	   facts	   lacking	   in	  Nietzsche’s	  works,	  he	  concludes	   that	  Nietzsche	  never	  
considered	  his	   own	  evaluative	   claims	   to	   admit	   of	   any	   objective	   support.	   To	   illustrate	   his	   point,	   Leiter	  
offers	  the	  following	  example:	  in	  the	  first	  essay	  of	  the	  Genealogy,	  Nietzsche	  presents	  the	  insight	  that	  the	  
virtues	   which	   slave	   morality	   extols	   are	   really	   essential	   traits	   of	   the	   weak	   ‘redescribed	   in	   morally	  
praiseworthy	  lights’,	  and	  seeks	  to	  reveal	  their	  actual	  nature.	  He	  considers	  traits	  distinctive	  of	  the	  low	  –	  
‘goodness	  of	  heart’,	  ‘humility’,	  ‘patience’,	  etc.	  –	  describing	  them	  as	  they	  truly	  are:	  ‘impotence’,	  ‘anxious	  
lowliness’,	  and	  ‘lingering	  at	  the	  door’,	  respectively	  (G	  I:	  13).	  But,	  Leiter	  suggests,	  to	  so	  describe	  them	  is	  
not	   to	   give	   an	   account	   of	   the	   objective	   facts	   in	   virtue	   of	   which	   the	   traits	   and	   types	   of	   individual	   he	  
despises	  are	  ‘low’.	   It	   is	   in	  effect	  merely	  to	  do	  what	  slave	  morality	   itself	  partakes	  of	  (though	  conflicting	  
evaluatively	  laden	  descriptions	  are	  offered	  by	  Nietzsche	  and	  slave	  morality	  of	  the	  same	  things)	  –	  to	  give	  
what	  he	  regards	  as	  characteristic	  of	  the	  ‘low’	  a	  negative	  gloss	  without	  really	  saying	  what	  facts	  about	  the	  
world	  make	  them	  detestable.	  	  
But	  if	  this	   is	  Leiter’s	  argument,	  then	  it	   is	  unconvincing.	  Though	  the	  passage	  he	  has	  selected	  to	  support	  
his	   reading	   may	   involve	   the	   relevant	   type	   of	   omission,	   many	   other	   passages	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	  
Nietzschean	   corpus	   in	   which	   the	   association	   is	   drawn	   between	   lowness	   and	   highness,	   goodness	   and	  
badness,	  and	  various	  objective	   facts.	   So,	   for	   instance,	   in	   section	  6	  of	  The	  Antichrist,	  Nietzsche	   tells	  us	  
that	  he	  has	  ‘drawn	  back	  the	  curtain’	  from	  the	  ‘corruption’	  of	  man,	  and	  calls	  the	  dominant	  values	  of	  his	  
day	  ‘decadence-­‐values’,	  but	  does	  more	  than	  cast	  them	  in	  a	  negative	  light.	  He	  also	  tells	  us	  what	  objective	  
conditions,	  according	  to	  his	  view,	  when	  present,	  justify	  our	  calling	  an	  individual	  ‘corrupt’	  or	  ‘decadent’:	  
I	   call	   an	   animal,	   a	   species,	   or	   an	   individual	   corrupt	   when	   it	   loses	   its	   instincts,	   when	   it	  
chooses,	  when	   it	   prefers,	  what	   is	   disadvantageous	   for	   it.	   (…)	   Life	   itself	   is	   to	  my	  mind	   the	  
instinct	  for	  growth,	  for	  durability,	  for	  an	  accumulation	  of	  forces,	  for	  power:	  where	  the	  will	  to	  
power	  is	  lacking	  there	  is	  decline.	  (A:	  6)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
So	  ‘corruption’	  or	  ‘decadence’	  are	  not	  merely	  terms	  Nietzsche	  wields	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  in	  his	  readers’	  
minds	  an	  unfavorable	   impression	  of	   the	   sorts	  of	   traits	   and	  people	  he	  dislikes,	   to	   infect	   them	  with	  his	  
own	   sensibilities.	   They	   are	   qualities	   that	   these	   traits	   and	   people	   possess	   in	   virtue	   of	   their	   possessing	  
certain	   other	   objective	   qualities	   –	   a	   loss	   of	   instinct	   for	   self-­‐preservation,	   -­‐enhancement,	   and	   -­‐
empowerment.	  Section	  258	  of	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil	  also	  addresses	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  corruption,	  and	  
here	   too	   Nietzsche’s	   approach	   proves	   more	   comprehensive	   than	   a	   mere	   appeal	   to	   his	   readers’	  
emotions.	   A	   brief	   and	   somewhat	   vague	   definition	   is	   offered	   of	   corruption	  which	  makes	   reference	   to	  
certain	  objective	  states	  of	  affairs,	   such	  as	   the	  presence	  of	   ‘a	   threatening	  anarchy	  among	  the	   instincts’	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and	   ‘the	   foundation	   of	   the	   affects’	   being	   ‘shaken’.	   And	   ‘a	   good	   and	   healthy	   aristocracy’	   is	   also	  
characterized	   as	   one	  with	   respect	   to	  which	   certain	   objective	   facts	   obtain.	   It	   is	   one	   guided	   by	   certain	  
mental	  convictions:	  
It	   experiences	   itself	   not	   as	   a	   function	   (whether	   of	   the	   monarchy	   or	   of	   the	  
commonwealth)	   but	   as	   their	  meaning	   and	   highest	   justification	   (…)	   it	   therefore	   accepts	  
with	  a	  good	  conscience	  the	  sacrifice	  of	  untold	  human	  beings,	  who,	  for	  its	  sake,	  must	  be	  
reduced	  and	  lowered	  to	  incomplete	  human	  beings,	  to	  slaves,	  to	  instruments.	  (BGE:	  258)	  
These,	  and	  numerous	  other,	  examples,	  must	  surely	  lead	  us	  to	  reject	  Leiter’s	  claim	  that	  all	  Nietzsche	  does	  
when	  he	   issues	  his	  evaluative	  claims	   is	  subject	  the	  things	  they	  assign	  or	  deny	  value	  to,	  to	   ‘a	  polemical	  
and	  evaluatively	  laden	  (re-­‐)characterization’.	  Nietzsche	  does	  often	  describe	  the	  objective	  facts	  in	  virtue	  
of	  which	  he	  takes	  his	  evaluative	  judgments	  to	  be	  justified.	  	  
So,	   it	   appears	   that	   realist	   interpretations	   of	   Nietzsche’s	   metaethical	   claims	   are	   somewhat	   harder	   to	  
dismiss	   than	   Leiter	   supposes.	   We	   have	   seen	   that	   making	   certain	   modifications	   to	   Schacht’s	   realist	  
reading	  will	  enable	  it	  to	  avoid	  the	  difficulties	  Leiter	  attributes	  to	  it,	  and	  that	  Foot’s	  weak	  realist	  reading	  
gains	  plausibility	  in	  light	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  recurring	  tendency	  to	  support	  his	  evaluative	  claims	  with	  reasons	  
that	  command	  widespread	  assent.	  We	  must	  thus	  conclude	  that	  the	  realist	  approach	  to	  making	  sense	  of	  
Nietzschean	  metaethics	  is	  a	  feasible	  one.	  	  
We	  may,	   at	   this	   final	   juncture,	   revisit	  our	  observation	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   study	   that	  Nietzsche,	   if	  
viewed	   as	   someone	   who	   both	   regards	   his	   own	   evaluative	   position	   as	   somehow	   privileged	   and	   is	  
committed	  to	  antirealism	  about	  all	  value,	  is	  in	  danger	  of	  incoherence.	  We	  have	  so	  far	  seen	  that	  there	  is	  
strong	  textual	  evidence	  for	  reading	  him	  as	  a	  moral	  error	   theorist,	  but	   that	  attempts	  to	  cast	  him	  as	  an	  
antirealist	   about	   other	   types	   of	   value	   can	   be	   plausibly	   resisted.	   If	   we	   regard	   Nietzsche’s	   evaluative	  
claims	  about	  certain	  types	  of	  people	  as	  claims	  about	  the	  non-­‐moral	  value	  they	  possess	  (and	  this	  is	  surely	  
what	   Nietzsche	   himself	   intended),	   and	   there	   remain	   grounds	   for	   reading	   him	   as	   a	   realist	   about	   non-­‐
moral	  value,	  or	  as	  someone	  who	  believed	  that	  some	  sort	  of	  robust	  justification	  could	  be	  given	  for	  non-­‐
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